Harold Garfinkel

Common Sense Knowledge of Social Structures (1959)

A Paper distributed at the Session on the Sociology of Knowledge, Fourth World Congress of Sociology, Stresa, Italy, September 12, 1959

Edited by
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Editorial Note

The text presented here was written by Harold Garfinkel for the Fourth World Congress of Sociology in Stresa (Italy) in 1959, where Garfinkel participated in the Section on the Sociology of Knowledge organized by Kurt Wolff. The “General Theme” of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology was “Society and Sociological Knowledge / La Société et la Connaissance Sociologique”. Garfinkel’s original Stresa paper had to be “heavily abridged” for publication (Garfinkel 1961). Garfinkel’s own editorial note in the published version refers to the full version by giving a list of what had to be omitted:

This paper is heavily abridged from an 80-page mimeographed version prepared for and distributed at the session on the Sociology of Knowledge, Fourth World Congress of Sociology, Stresa, Italy, September 12, 1959. Because of space limitations it was necessary to omit materials dealing with the general set ‘corpus of knowledge’; descriptions of the work of the documentary method and a report of an experiment that permitted these workings to be explored; Schutz’s descriptions of the attitude of daily life; the problem of whether the documentary method is a necessary feature of sociological inquiry; the consequences for stable features of social structures of several types of transformations of the presuppositions of the corpus of common-sense knowledge. These materials are treated at appropriate length in the author’s book in preparation, ‘Common-Sense Actions as Topic and Feature of Sociological Inquiry’. (Garfinkel 1961:51)

Harold Garfinkel did indeed write a book proposal that mentions the paper written for the Fourth World Congress of Sociology as a core chapter for a future book publication. One version of this book proposal (which can be found in the Garfinkel Archive at Newbury Port) summarizes the position of the Stresa Paper as follows:

Book in Preparation: COMMON SENSE ACTIONS AND COMMON SENSE KNOWLEDGE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES AS TOPIC AND FEATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY

I have been collecting materials for this book since coming to UCLA in September 1954. The attached papers, including the outline, are studies in preparation for the book. In one way or another the general topic and its specific sub-topics have informed almost all my work as its central vision. My interests in the topic started when I was a graduate student at Harvard and was inspired by the writings of the late Alfred Schutz.

The Paper, ‘Common Sense Knowledge of Social Structures’, included in this package, was written last summer for the meetings of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology in the attempt to formulate in a definitive fashion many of the book’s principal arguments. A long study that I have been writing this year, ‘Linguistic Order, Language Games, and Ethnoscience’ corrects some errors in this paper, and completes its arguments by formulating and solving the problem of literal description (evidence) in the events of human conduct. A final paper on practical circumstances and rules that de-
fine ‘good strategies’ in common sense situations of choice, much of it based on the work of the polish logician <sic>, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, remains to be written. When this is done the main arguments will have been made and the final work toward publication will start. The attached papers on jurors are illustrative studies that bear on the topic of decision making and rules of ‘good decisions’ in practical situations of choice.

Materials include in addition to the materials of the package about 340 pages of transcribed seminar discussions of various topic <sic> relevant to the book; about 225 pages of notes on Kotarbinski and ‘practical’ actions in sociological inquiry; and about 400 pages of transcribed seminar discussions and notes on ethnomethodology and ethnomedicine, the last materials having being gathered for the most part during the past year at Harvard.

During 1958 a collaboration was attempted with Dr. Aaron V. Cicourel of Northwestern University. Dr. Cicourel offered to contribute to the book studies in which the book’s argument would be applied to current and generally unsatisfactory applications of mathematics and conventional statistical method in sociological inquiries to handle the problem of rigorous and literal descriptions of sociological events. We terminated the collaboration when we could no longer agree on the book’s contents. (Manuscript in the Garfinkel Archive, Newbury Port)

This proposal gives further indication that the Stresa Paper was actually written for the Fourth World Congress of Sociology, and in 1959/1960 was to form the nucleus of a book which never materialized. Aaron Cicourel’s planned and then abandoned contribution to the joint book was to form the nucleus of his first book publication (Cicourel 1964), which is well-known in the sociological literature and the social sciences. The collaboration with Cicourel is mentioned in the first note of the Stresa Paper, which mentions the book project: “The materials for this paper are taken from a book in preparation by the author and Dr. Aaron V. Cicourel, Northwestern University.”

The context of Garfinkel’s invitation to the Fourth World Congress of Sociology and its Section on the Sociology of Knowledge is summarized by Kurt Wolff in the Transactions of the World Congress as follows:

Deep grief, far beyond our meeting, was caused by the death of Professor Alfred Schutz, on 20 May 1959. As late as half a year before, Professor Schutz, despite his poor health, had expressed his hope that he would be able to contribute a paper, *A program for the Sociology of Knowledge*. Less than two months later, he had to give up this hope. His death is terrible for those who had the good fortune to know him; it is a great loss to social science and philosophy at large; to sociology in particular, in setting an abrupt, premature end to the ongoing phenomenological analysis of the scientific study of social life that had come to us from him. One of us who has learned from him and his work, Professor Harold Garfinkel, has dedicated his contribution to this volume to Alfred Schutz’s memory; and there is some comfort, at least, in the fact that his principal work, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (originally published in 1932 and long out of print), has been reissued, and in the plan for collecting his essays in volumes to be edited by one of his students and friends, Professor Maurice Natanson. (Wolff 1961:viii)

Garfinkel’s dedication is found in the first note:

Readers who are acquainted with the magnificent writings of the late Alfred Schutz will recognize the size of the debt that the paper owes to him. The paper is respectfully dedicated to him as an esteemed teacher and sociologist.

Comparing the original Stresa Paper and the abridged publication (Garfinkel 1961), it becomes all the more obvious that some crucial aspects of Garfinkel’s argument that are pertinent both to Garfinkel’s concept of ethnomethodology and to his discussion of Schütz, are missing in the abridged publication. The present edition of Harold Garfinkel’s manuscript “Common Sense Knowledge of Social Structures” is thus both an original publication and the re-edition of a pre-publication distributed amongst participants at the Fourth World Congress of Sociology in Stresa, Italy, in 1959. The editing has been carefully arranged and monitored by Christian Erbacher (Siegen), reproducing Garfinkel’s original typescript as faithfully as possible (and even line by line) with the help of Anne dos Santos Reis and Julia Jung (to whom we owe a big Thank You). Obvious orthographic mistakes have been corrected; the original page numbers of the typescript are included in the text. Only the typescript itself has been transcribed, and none of the often hardly legible handwritten commentaries and modifications found in the original. Readers interested in Garfinkel’s manuscript versions are kindly asked to consult the unpublished corpus in the Garfinkel Archive, Newburyport, Massachusetts. All rights of this edition and further publications of the Stresa paper, parts of the paper or future translations remain the exclusive custody of Anne Warfield Rawls (Bentley University, Boston, and University of Siegen, Germany).

The present text may be categorized as a “missing link” both in the history of Ethnomethodology and in a crucial period of the history of the Post-War Social Sciences. In fact, it is called “an essay in ‘Ethnomethodology’” on the first page. Readers familiar with Harold Garfinkel’s writings are advised to read *Parsons’ Primer* first, recently edited and published with several commentaries and appendices by Anne Warfield Rawls and Jason Turowetz (Garfinkel 2019), and
to read especially “Appendix #2” on “The Situated Character of Garfinkel’s Comments about Influences on his Work” (Garfinkel 2019:357–360). Readers neither familiar with Garfinkel’s writings nor with ethnomethodology will be offered a unique chance to encounter a fresh and substantial philosophical argument concerning an unexplored realm of social theory. Notwithstanding this unique opportunity, these readers should not hesitate to read Garfinkel’s Studies in Ethnomethodology too (especially the first three chapters), to find out what happened after Stresa. Sed opera sapientiae certa lege vallantur et in finem debitum efficaciter diriguntur. (Eco 1982:261)

Erhard Schüttpelz
(Cologne and Aix-en-Chapelle, December 2019)

Literature


Although textbooks on methods warn the sociological investigator that departures from prescribed procedures will distort the objective world in a mirror of prejudice, a troublesome question generally remains, unasked and unanswered: what kinds of objective worlds result from the actual decisions that he must make in coming to term with the actual circumstances within which his inquiry must be accomplished? Little information is available on the consequences that different actual methods have in producing a body of knowledge of the society with properties that are particular to the actual methods that produce this body of knowledge. This paper is concerned with characteristic actual rules for deciding among alternative courses of investigative and interpretative procedure that serve professional sociologists as solutions to their tasks of deciding sensibility, objectivity, and warrant, and of the properties of the body of fact that result from these procedures.

It is not the purpose of this paper, however, to engage in the tiresome complaint that discrepancies exist between sociologists’ claims and practices, nor to engage in the equally tiresome defense of sociologists’ claims to the scientific character of their endeavors. It is instead an essay in “ethnomethodology.”

Anthropologists use terms like “ethnomedicine” and “ethnobiology” to refer to the matters of fact and theory about medical and biological topics that actual persons in actual societies construct, test, honor, use, criticize, and hold each other to a knowledge of within the constraints that a respect for the socially organized character of everyday activities place upon a collectivity member’s interest in fact and theory about medical and biological topics. The term “ethnomethodology” is intended in the sense consistent with this usage. Ethnomethodology refers to the matters of fact and theory that actual persons in actual societies construct, test, honor, use, criticize, and hold each other to a knowledge of within the constraints that a respect for the socially organized management of everyday affairs place upon a collectivity member’s interests in fact and theory as such.

A person will be said to be engaged in the activities of inquiry when he is addressed to the tasks of clarifying the nature and related character of some set of events. His theoretical tasks consist of the problems he must solve in conceiving the event that he has chosen to study. His empirical tasks consist of developing, to an extent acceptable to him, cogent, credible, clear, reproduceable, literal descriptions of these events.

In accomplishing these tasks, the person subjects his efforts in some measure to a “discipline.” Some set of rules of procedure, which we shall call his methods, serve as maxims of conduct to govern his decisions of theorizing and inquiry. In the manner of any legitimate order to which action may be oriented, these maxims serve him and others as grounds for the legitimate criticisms of his decisions and their products. His rules of
procedure serve him as definitions of “correct inference,” “correct proof,” “correct findings,” and the like. They serve as the terms in which he decides the logically necessary relationships in the data. Call this the sensibility in his theorizing. They are the terms in which he decides that his findings can be treated as holding irrespective of who it is that recommends them (the anonymity of the observer),3 and that his findings hold for Anyman (communality).4 Call this the objectivity of his description. Finally, they are the terms in which he decides whether or not a proposition can correctly be used as grounds of further inferences and investigation. Call this the credibility of his findings, or, his definition of “fact.”

Any set of rules of procedure that an inquirer uses, whether he uses them as ideal or actual maxims, in that they define5 “correct decisions,” serve as solutions6 to these questions of sensibility, objectivity, and credibility. Thereby, too, whether an inquirer has scientific interests in his inquiries or not, whether he be a physicist, a sociologist, a juror, a member of a board of inquiry, a business executive, a child, or a mathematician, has some solution to these problems. Scientific methodology, the study of definitions of correct scientific decisions, begins its tasks with this elementary fact for it takes as the data for its inquiries solutions in use. Ethnomethodology as the study of the definitions of correct decisions for inquiries in everyday situations also takes as its data solutions in use.

Because every person who addresses inquiries to the events of human conduct operates with some solution to these questions, the varieties of human types, interests, and circumstances dictate the existence of variety of solutions in use. To each set of rules that define correct decisions in the tasks of deciding sensibility, objectivity, and warrant there corresponds the product of these decisions in the form of preferred conception and terminologies (theories) and sanctionable grounds of further sociological inference and inquiry (fact). Hence, one must anticipate the existence of different sets of propositions that propose features of social structure that persons will treat as correct grounds of further inference and action. These must consist of descriptions of life in society that some set of persons use as sanctionable grounds of further inference and action that other sets of persons, assuming that they knew these propositions, would not sanction.

Daily life and scientific use of the concept, “fact.” A definition is required that covers both cases

In the course of their everyday affairs7 persons are as concerned as scientific investigators with distinctions between fact and fancy, truth and falsity, conjecture, hypothesis, personal opinion and the like. They do not consult the scientist or the philosopher of science in deciding either the sensible character of what they are talking about or the warranted status of their descriptions of the social situations within which as Schutz remarks, “they must find their bearing and with which they must come to terms.”

Since it is the case that persons engaged in the activities of scientific theorizing as well as those engaged in the activities of everyday life make, insist upon, and use distinctions between fact and non-fact, we are required to ask for a conception of “fact” that not only will cover the actual uses involved in these two as well as other types of activity, but will permit us to compare various uses. It cannot serve our purposes, therefore, to use the practicing scientist’s conception of fact as our definition since we propose
to do something else than treat everyday uses as interesting but erroneous
departures from the meanings of truth, meaning, and reality in scientific
discourse and activity.

Felix Kaufmann’s conception of “fact”
The conception of fact that we require is furnished by Felix Kaufmann in
his book, Methodology of the Social Sciences. Felix Kaufmann points out that the
factual or other character of a proposition cannot be decided by consulting
the events that the proposition proposes since the intended sense of the
proposition is decided by a set of rules in terms of which the correct
interpretation of a sentence, i.e. its propositional character, is decided. Thus the factual character of a proposition is a property that that proposition
acquires by virtue of a rule in terms of which the user decides that its
sense had been correctly assigned. For example, consider the sentence
“Marry in haste, repent at leisure.” As the rules defining a correct assign-
ment of sense vary, they yield us the propositional status of this sentence
as a statement of fact, a rule of procedure, a command, a rule of preference,
a moral injunction, an hypothesis, and so on.

Kaufmann proposes that the factual character of a proposition, i.e. its
sense as a factual proposition, consists in the feature that it has acquired
for a user that the restricted frame of possible occurrences that the proposition
proposes are correct grounds of further inference and action. The proposition
acquires this feature by a rule that assigns the feature to it. The assignment
occurs only through the fact that a rule actually governs the use of the
proposition as grounds of further inference and action. The rule, therefore,
is itself the definition of “correct use.” Where one talks of fact, therefore,
one talks of the sense that a proposition has of its actual or potential use
for a user as correct grounds of that user’s further inference and action. To
say therefore of a proposition that it is a factual one is equivalent to saying
that it has acquired as a part of its meaning that what it proposes is warranted.

More conventionally speaking, it has been assigned the logical status of a
warranted proposition.

For the interests of this paper say instead that the proposition has been
admitted to membership in a general set, “body of knowledge,” K, by having met
the conditions of admission stated in a set of rules R that define the members
of that set. Within a theory of social action “correct” means sanctionable or
legitimate. Interpreted in terms of activity, i.e. of an actor’s use of a
proposition, “correct” is defined by a rule in the set of rules R which in
defining the conditions of membership in the set K, thereby defines the
conditions under which corrective action may legitimately be taken.

The general set, K

A proposition p is an element in the set of propositions, K, in terms of
a set of rules R which define the conditions of membership in the set, K. If,
for a user, a proposition has the feature that its use as grounds for further
inference and action is correct, then we mean this feature of the proposition
by saying of the proposition that it is a member of the set, K.

For all sub-sets of K, regardless of what the member propositions of the
sub-sets may propose, and regardless of what rules the sub-sets of the set
R may consist of, all members of all the sub-sets of K have as their common
feature, “correct grounds of further inference and action.” Any other properties
that these propositions might have— for example their content or their clarity—from now on will be treated as correlates of this definitive feature.

Any rule whatsoever is a member of the general set of rules, R, if it serves the user of it to define the conditions of correct use of a proposition as grounds of further inference and action. Any other properties that these rules might have— for example, their content, their number, their compatibility with each other— from now on will be treated as correlates of this definitive feature.

By defining the conditions of correct belief, the set of rules R defines the term “credible knowledge,” or “fact.” The term “correct” is defined by the set of rules R in that they define the conditions under which corrective action may be taken when a proposition is used as grounds of further inference and action.

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The rules of the set R are “maxims of conduct”

The term “a rule in the set R” will be used synonymously and interchangeably with the term “maxim of conduct.” “Maxim of conduct” is defined as any set of possible events that a person may use as a standard and which he seeks through his actions to produce and/or respects as a governing condition of his actions.13

We shall follow Max Weber14 and say that the “existence” of a rule is synonymous with that rule’s “validity.” The validity of a rule in the set R consists of the probability that compliance with it as a maxim of conduct will be enforced.

Hence, viewed with respect to a user’s use, the warranted status of a set of propositions K consists of the likelihood that the rules R that govern their use as grounds of further inference and action will be enforced. This likelihood is determined by whatever conditions of group life determine the features of normatively regulated conduct.

The concept of the validity of a set of rules R applies to all sub-sets of R.

If there is a K, e.g. Ki that has the properties of a strict scientific body of propositions— e.g. clarity of reference to observable phenomena, logical compatibility, provisional membership.— then there corresponds to it a set of rules, R, whose enforcement produces a corpus with such properties. Similarly, if there is a K, e.g. K that has other properties, as for example those of a body of common sense propositions— discussed below in detail— then there corresponds to it a set of rules R, whose enforcement produces a corpus with such properties. Then, for each set of rules there would be a set of social arrangements under which inquiries that are governed by that set of rules with its resulting products occur, and other social arrangements under which they do not occur.

Examples from scientific activity as this activity is described and understood in the ideal, and in practice

For scientific activity as it is ideally described and ideally understood, membership in the sub-set, “Ideal scientific body of knowledge,” is constituted according to the rule that a proposition may be admitted to this set if and only if the restricted frame of possible occurrences that the proposition proposes actually have been observed. The decision to use a set of depicted possible events as grounds of further inference and action is correct according to the single rule that the status of correct use can be assigned only upon the occurrence of an actual observation of the intended possible events. In
science as it is ideally described, admission is decided on the grounds of this rule exclusively.

In all sciences as they are ideally described, the probability that the rule of observation will be enforced as the single and exclusive condition of admission to a science’s body of knowledge, for that science is certainty. This holds for the corpus of knowledge of the ideally described and understood social scientific activities as well. This may be seen by examining the textbooks on methods written by and for social scientists. This phenomenon may be observed, too, if one asks social scientists whether, in the ideal, other grounds than those provided for in the rule of observation are sanctioned for deciding membership in the body of social scientific knowledge.

In the actual practices of the natural sciences, most particularly physics, the discrepancies between the normative description of warranting decisions and the actual warranting decisions are small. Although the possibility exists that physicists might use alternative rules in assigning a proposition its warrant, in the actual conduct of physicists, I am told, the rule of observation is used with overwhelming frequency and is exclusively chosen. The exclusive choice, made with overwhelming frequency, is rather strictly enforced. The “validity” of the rule of observation among physicists consists of the very high probability, though one that is perhaps necessarily short of certainty, that the exclusive use of the rule of observation will be enforced in admitting propositions to membership in the set, “Actual physical science body of knowledge.”

On the other hand, in the actual practices of social scientists, discrepancies between the normative descriptions of warranting conduct of social scientific investigators and their actual warranting conduct are prominent. In addition to the rule of observation, other rules serve to define social scientific fact. For example, frequently a coherent description that accords in meaning with what has already been accorded the status of fact will obtain warrant for the description. The products of this procedure fill the textbooks.

To summarize:

It was pointed out that to each set of rules R there corresponded a corpus K that the rules R constitute as a set of propositions that a user may use as correct grounds of further inference and action. Brief notice was taken of the corpus of ideal scientific knowledge that is the product of ideally described and ideally understood scientific activities. The exclusively used rule of actual observation is the sole member of this set of rules. Its “validity” is certainty. Brief mention was made of the corpuses of “actual physical knowledge” and “actual social scientific knowledge” as products of the actual warranting rules and their validity.

What features of a body of knowledge are the products of the exclusive use of the rule of observation?

If there is a close correspondence between normative and actual exclusive use of the rule of observation as a warranting procedure, the body of knowledge that is produced has such well known properties as logical coherence, internal consistency, the absence of contradictory propositions, and the like. These properties arise as consequences of this correspondence. This may be demonstrated as follows. To begin with, the corpus represents propositions which are the correct grounds of further inference. Therefore, to say that a proposition cannot be admitted to the corpus unless it conforms to the exclusive
administration of the rule of observation means that what a proposition proposes as the intended event conforms to the thing that is observed. Thereby, the property of clarity in the intended event is introduced. Given this property, adherence to the rule of observation would have as its consequence that one could not assign membership to a proposition as long as the contradictory of that proposition enjoyed membership. Therefore if a proposition were introduced, its contradictory would be discarded. Hence, by starting with a corpus of fact, strict adherence to the rule of observation produces a “self cleansing” operation upon that corpus. Such concepts as the progressive clarification of the corpus, and the provisional status of fact, are ways of referring to the mechanisms of this self cleansing operation. Thus, for example, the concept of progressive clarification consists of a concern for clarity and coherence in approximation to an ideal which itself consists of the tasks of keeping the cleansing operation going.

Are there corpuses of fact with different properties than these? Such a corpus would exist if the rule of observation either was not used or was not used exclusively. The properties of such a corpus would then be particular to whatever rules of procedure actually governed the assignment or withdrawal of a proposition’s membership in the corpus.

There is such an alternative rule in sociological inquiry. Karl Mannheim described this rule. He referred to it as the “rule of the documentary method of interpretation.” Not only is it used in conjunction with the rule of observation but it enjoys priority in use and enforcement over the rule of observation in deciding sensibility and warrant. In order to justify these assertions I should first like to consider the features of situations of investigative decisions in sociological inquiry within which the rule of the documentary method has a particular and perhaps indispensable place in sociological inquiry. After this is done, I shall describe the rule in detail.

Decision making in situations with common sense features

There are many situations of sociological inquiry in which the investigator must choose among alternative courses of action despite the fact that the future states of his present situation are essentially non-calculable. For convenience I shall refer to such a situation by the term “common sense situation of choice.” What are the specific features of a “common sense situation of choice?” For persons in such situations, what rules define “good choices?” What bodies of knowledge are the products of such choices? What properties do such bodies of knowledge have?

Because its features may be appreciated by their contrast with those of calculable situations of choice, I would like to begin by first describing the latter.

Calculable situations of choice

Most of the available descriptions and conceptions of investigative decision making and problem solving have assigned to the decision maker’s situation the following features:

1. From the decision maker’s point of view there exists as a feature of each of his Here and Now states of affairs a recognizable goal with specifiable features. Where sociological inquiry is concerned, this goal consists of the investigator’s present problem for the solution to which the investigation will have been undertaken. The goal’s specifiable features consist of the criteria whereby, as of any present state of affairs, he decides the adequacy
with which his problem has been formulated. In their terms too, the event, “adequate solution,” is defined as one of a set of possible occurrences.

2. The decision maker is conceived to have set for himself the task of devising a program of manipulations upon each successive present state of affairs that will alter each present state so that over their succession they are brought into conformity with an anticipated state, i.e., the goal, the solved problem.

These features may be restated in terms of the concept of corpus. An investigator’s problem may be regarded as a proposition whose “application” for membership, i.e., whose warranted status, is under review. The rules of procedure whereby its warranted status is decided thereby operationally define what is meant by “adequate solution.” In ideal scientific activities an investigator is required to decide the steps that define an adequate solution prior to his taking the decided steps. He is required to make this decision before he carries out the operations whereby the possibilities that the proposition proposes will be decided as to their having actually occurred or not. The task of deciding an adequate solution thereby has logical precedence over the actual observation. The observation is said thereby to be “programmed,” or alternatively, the intended event is given an “operational definition,” or alternatively, the conditions for the occurrence of an intended event are furnished, or alternatively, a “prediction” is made.

In ideal scientific inquiry, the prototype of a situation in which this logical priority is enforced is the experiment. Conformity to this priority is sometimes referred to in the “shop” by injunctions against ex post facto analysis. Ex post facto analysis is one way of violating this normatively required priority. In ideal scientific activities such a violation is called a “procedural error.” Upon its occurrence corrective action may be legitimately undertaken.

In some cases, studies of decision making have been interested in those programs that represent fully calculated solutions to the decision maker’s problem. In other cases studies have addressed the fact that the decision maker may invoke probabilistic rules to decide the differential likelihood that alternative courses of action would alter a present state of affairs in the desired direction.

For convenience, call a decision maker’s situation that is problematic for him in these ways a “simple” situation. “Simple” is intended to refer only to the rational calculability of solutions to a present problematic state of affairs. Simple does not refer to the complexities of the calculations that may be involved. Thus for example, any present state of the game in chess, in game theoretic terms, is in principal a simple situation in the sense that chess theoreticians are agreed that a calculated solution that would produce a winning state of the game exists for every present state of the game. That technological difficulties prevent the explication of the program is beside the point.

When the ideally described and ideally understood rules of scientific sociological practices are used to conceive the actions referred to by the phrase “the scientific treatment of a problem,” the meaning is that a problem that is presented in any initial way is transformed in its sense so as to permit the investigator to address the problem and its solution as a “simple” situation.
But the actual situations in which sociological investigators characteristically make their decisions frequently contrast remarkably with those of simple situations. Most particularly is this the case in situations of field work, where the investigator must rely upon conversations for his materials.

**Common sense situations of choice**

1. In the course of an interview an investigator addresses a series of present situations whose future states that a contemplated course of treatment will produce are characteristically vague or even unknown. With overwhelming frequency these as of Here and Now possible future states are only sketchily specifiable prior to undertaking the action that is intended to realize them. I wish to stress a distinction between a “Possible future state of affairs” and a “How-to-bring-it-about-future-from-a-present-state-of-affairs-as-an-actual-point-of-departure.” The “Possible future state of affairs” may be very clear indeed. But such a future is not the matter of interest. Instead we are concerned with the “How to bring it about from a Here and Now Future.” It is this state,—for convenience, call it “an operational future”—that is characteristically vague or unknown.

An illustration. A trained survey researcher can describe with remarkable clarity and definiteness what questions he wishes answers to in a questionnaire. How actual replies of actual subject are to be evaluated as “replies to the questions” are incorporated in a set if procedural decisions known as “coding rules.” Any distribution of replies to the questions that is possible under the coding rules is a “possible future state of affairs.” After suitable exploratory work such distributions are clearly and definitely imaginable to trained field workers. But with overwhelming frequency it occurs that even late in the actual course of the inquiry the questions and answers that will in effect have been asked and answered under the various ways of evaluating actual subject’s responses as “replies to the question,” given the practical exigencies that must be accommodated in accomplishing the actual work of the inquiry, remain sketchy and open to “reasonable decision” even up to the point of writing the results of the inquiry.

2. Given a future, any future, that is known in a definite way, the alternative paths to actualize the future state as a set of step-wise operations upon some beginning present state are characteristically sketchy, incoherent, an unelaborated. Again I wish to stress the difference between an inventory of available procedures,—investigators can talk about these quite definitely and clearly— and the deliberately pre-programmed step-wise procedures, a set of predecided “what-to-do-in-case-of” strategies for the manipulation of a succession of actual present state of affairs in their course. In actual practices such a program is characteristically an unelaborated one.

For example, one of the tasks involved in “managing rapport” consists of managing the step-wise course of the conversation in such a way as to permit the investigator to commit his questions in profitable sequence while retaining some control over the unknown and undesirable directions in which affairs, as a function of the course of the actual exchange, may actually move. Characteristically the researcher substitutes for a preprogrammed step-wise solution, a set of ad hoc tactics for adjusting to present opportunity, with these tactics only generally governed by what the investigator would hope to have finally found out by the end of the
conversation. Under such circumstances, it is more accurate to talk of investigators acting in fulfillment of their hopes, or in avoidance of their fears, than of acting in the deliberate and calculated realization of a plan.

3. It frequently occurs that the investigator takes an action, and only upon the actual occurrence of some product of that action do we find him reviewing the accomplished sequences in a retrospective search therein for their decided character. Insofar as the decision that was taken is assigned by the work of the retrospective search, the outcome of such situations can be said to occur before the decision. Such situations occur with dramatic frequency at the time the journal article is being written.

4. Prior to his actually having to choose among alternative courses of action on the basis of anticipated consequences, the investigator, for various reasons, is frequently unable to anticipate the consequences of his alternative courses of action and may have to rely upon his actual involvement in order to learn what they might be.

5. Frequently, after encountering some actual state of affairs, the investigator may count it as desirable, and thereupon treat it as the goal toward which his previously taken actions, as he reads them retrospectively, were directed “all along” or “after all.”

6. It frequently occurs that only in the course of actually manipulating a present situation, and as a function of his actual manipulation, does the nature of an investigator’s future state of affairs become clarified. Thus the goal of the investigation may be progressively defined as the consequence of the investigator actually taking action toward a goal whose features as of any present state of his investigative action he does not see clearly.

7. Characteristically such situations are ones of imperfect information. The result is that the investigator is unable to assess, let alone calculate, the difference that his ignorance in the situation makes upon the accomplishment of his activities. Nor, prior to having to take action, is he able either to evaluate their consequences or to assess the value of alternative courses of action.

8. The information that he possesses, that serves him as the basis for the election of strategies, is rarely codified. Hence, his estimates of the likelihood of success or failure characteristically have little in common with the rational mathematical concept of probability.

In their investigative activities, investigators characteristically must manage situations with the above features, given the following additional conditions: that some action must be taken; that the action must be taken by a time and in pace, duration, and phasing that is coordinate with the actions of other; that the risk of unfavorable outcomes must somehow be managed; that the actions taken and their products will be subject to review by others and must be justified to them; that the elections of courses of action and the resultant outcome must be justified within the procedure of “reasonable” review; and that the entire process must occur within the conditions of and respect for corporately organized social activity. In their “shop talk,” investigators refer to these features of their actual situations of inquiry and to the necessity for managing them as their “practical circumstances.”

Call the enumerated features, “common sense features”; for convenience, call the entire set of enumerated features and conditions a “complex situation.
of choice.” An everyday example of a “complex situation of choice” is found where a salesman encounters a prospect who remains to be sold a product that the salesman may desire to select for him, but with the nature of what the customer will have purchased, and the customer’s resistance, being specifically unknown and noncalculable to the salesman except as he engages himself with the prospective purchaser. An instructor going through a course, most particularly for the first time, having to arrange his materials into a series of lectures, frequently plays a short term strategy so as to build up a continuing “sense of the course.” Typically, he is not able to tell, prior to his starting to teach, what it is that he finally will have conveyed to the students in the way of a specific subject matter as a function of the actual series of accomplished lectures and attendant interactions with students.

In psychiatric practice the situations that the psychotherapist typically finds himself in and must work his way through with patients are complex situations. In sociological investigations the above features are most obviously characteristic of field work situations. Protagonists for methods of survey research and laboratory experimentation frequently assert their exemption from investigative situations with such characteristics. After World War II a flood of textbooks on methods were written to provide remedies for such situations. These methods are intended to depict the ways of transforming complex situations into simple ones. Most particularly the use of mathematical models and statistical schemes of inference are invoked as calculable solutions to the problems of sensibility, objectivity, and warrant. It is common knowledge, however, that in the overwhelming number of cases there are dramatic discrepancies between the theoretical properties of the intended findings of inquirers, and the mathematical assumptions that must be satisfied if the statistical measures are to be used for the literal description of the intended events. The result is that statistical measurements are most frequently used as indicators, as signs of, as representing or standing on behalf of the intended findings rather than as evidence of them. Thus, there is some reason to think that other investigators besides field researchers operate in complex situations.

What rules are used to warrant the products of researchers undertaken in complex situations of choice?

The rule of the documentary method of interpretation

A prominent rule that is used to warrant the findings of researchers undertaken in situations with common sense features is the rule of the documentary method of interpretation. The rule, in use, itself defines the method of common sense thinking and conduct.

According to Karl Mannheim the documentary method involves the search for “..... an identical, homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of totally different realizations of meaning.”

This involves the treatment of an appearance as “the document of,” as “pointing to” a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences, but the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of “what is known” about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other.
A demonstration of the documentary method was designed that exaggerated the feature of this method in use and permitted its features to be explored.20

Ten undergraduates were solicited by telling them that research was being done in the Department of Psychiatry to explore alternative means to psychotherapy as a way of giving persons advice about their personal problems (sic). Each subject was seen individually by an experimenter who was falsely represented as a student counselor in training. The subject was asked to first discuss the background to some serious problem on which he would like advice, and then to address to the “counselor” a series of questions each of which would permit a “Yes” or “No” answer. The subject was promised that the “counselor” would attempt to answer to the best of his ability.

The experimenter-counselor heard the questions and gave his answers from an adjoining room, via an intercommunication system. After describing his problem and furnishing some background to it, the subject asked his first question. After a standard pause, the experimenter announced his answer, “Yes” or “No.” According to instructions, the subject then removed a wall plug connecting him with the counselor so that the “counselor will not hear your remarks” and tape recorded his comments on the exchange. After these were completed, the subject plugged the microphone in and asked his next question. After he received the answer, he again recorded his comments, and this proceeded through at least 10 questions and answers. The subject had been told, “Most people want to ask at least 10 questions.” The sequence of answers, evenly divided between Yes’s and No’s, was predecided with a table of random numbers. All subjects asking the same number of questions were administered the same series of yes and no answers. Following the exchange of questions and answers the subject was asked to summarize his impressions of the entire exchange. An interview followed. The following are illustrative unedited protocols.

Case 1:

SUBJECT: Ok, this is the situation that I am presented with. I happen to be of the Jewish faith and I have been dating a gentile girl now for about two months. My dad is not directly opposed to this situation, but I feel at the same time that he is not exactly pleased with it. Mother feels that as long as dad is not directly opposed to this situation that I should go ahead and continue dating until he makes some direct statement to the contrary. My reason for feeling why he is not too pleased with this is that he has never said don’t date her, but at the same time he will come up with digs and sayings that make me feel very ill at ease about dating the girl. My question is, do you feel under present circumstances that I should continue or stop dating this girl? Let me put that in a positive way. Do you feel that I should continue dating this girl?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: No. Well that is kind of interesting. I kinda feel that there is really no great animosity between dad and I but well perhaps he feels that greater dislike will grow out this. I suppose or maybe it is easier for an outsider to see certain things that I am blind to at this moment.
I would like to ask my second question now.

EXPERIMENTER: OK

SUBJECT: Do you feel that I should have a further discussion with dad about this situation or not? Should I have further discussion with dad over this subject about dating the gentile girl?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: Well I feel that is reasonable but I really don't know what to say to him. I mean he seems to be not really too understanding. In other words he seems to be afraid really to discuss the situation. I mean at least it appears that way to me so far. But I guess if it is worthwhile to me, if I really want to continue to date her that I will go on and have this discussion with dad. I really don't know what to say because I mean I am dating her. I am not in love with her or anything but I really never know what is going to come out. I guess we should have a discussion based on what the future possibilities might be and how he would feel about that. He may not be too strongly opposed now because we are only dating but perhaps he sees future complications that he would really like to get off his chest at the moment. I am ready for my third question now.

If after having my conversation with dad and he says to continue dating her but at the same time he gives me an impression that he is really not, he really does not want me to date her, but he is only doing it because he wants to be a good dad should under these conditions, should I still date the girl?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: Well I am actually surprised at the answer. I expected a no answer on that. Perhaps this is because you are not quite aware of my dad and his reactions and he seems to be the type of person that is sensitive and therefore he is very careful in the way that he will handle things. Even though he might have said go ahead and date her I perhaps would feel guilty in knowing that he really did not want me to continue to date her. Though I don't know that it would actually help the situation any. So, well, perhaps we will look into this further and that is another question. I am ready for the fourth question now.

If after having this discussion with dad and getting a positive answer from him but at the same time felt that this was not his honest opinion do you think that it would be proper for me to have my mother have a serious talk with him and therefore try and get a truer reaction to dad's opinion on the situation?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: Well this seems fair to me. I feel perhaps that he would be honester with mother about the situation. Of course that might present a problem. Would mother come back and be completely honest with me? She seems to be more liberal than dad not to say that mother would lie about it, but
she would be a little more liberal about things like this and perhaps in her course of conversation with dad she would try and present my side to him and therefore once again I get two answers. If I look at it that way I don’t think that I am going to get to first base anyway, but at least I feel that we are moving along some way. I am ready for my fifth question now.

Do you think that I should tell this gentile girl who I am dating the problem that I am having with my folks at home or should I wait until, well that is another question. Do you feel that I should tell the girl that I am dating the problems that I am having at home over her religion?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: Well once again I am surprised. I of course, that might depend on how much you care for the girl and how much longer I feel that I am going to be dating her. But I personally feel that it is only right to tell her for if she is perhaps thinking more serious than I am she might, it might be best for us to understand the full situation and if she feels that this will be a block then I feel perhaps that would end the situation right there without telling her. I feel that perhaps I am going to show this in different ways and she will be unaware of what the real situation is and perhaps react back to me in a certain way spoiling our dating and everything else like that. I am ready for my sixth question.

If I was to fall in love with this girl and want to make plans for marriage do you feel that it is fair that I should ask her to change her religion over to my belief?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: Well, no. Well, this has me stymied, No. Well, I honestly feel that I have been brought up in a certain way and I realize that she has too, and I feel pretty strong about the way that I believe. Not that I am completely orthodox or anything, but of course there is always family pressure and things like that. And I am quite sure that she feels, unfortunately I have never seen a family with a split in religion that really has been able to make success out of it. So I don’t know. I think that perhaps I would be tempted to ask her to change. I don’t think that I would be able to really. I am ready for number seven.

Do you feel that it would be a better situation if we were to get married and neither one of us were willing to talk about the religious difference or to give in on either one side that we bring our children up in a neutral religion other than the two that we believe in?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: Well perhaps this would be a solution. If we could find a religion that would incorporate our two beliefs to a certain extent. I realize that perhaps this might be literally impossible to do. Perhaps in a sense this neutral religion might be something almost made up by ourselves because I honestly feel that religious training no matter which belief if it is not carried to extremes is good for everyone should have
a certain amount of religious training along these lines. Perhaps this might be a solution to my problem. I guess I should follow this along a little bit further and see exactly what happens. I am ready for number eight.

If we were to get married would it be best for us to live in a new community where we will not be in contact with our parents if we were getting a lot of family pressure over religious differences?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: Well I kinda tend to agree with this answer. I feel that you wouldn’t be accomplishing too much by running away from the issue and that perhaps it would be one of those things in life that eventually you would just be willing to accept it and that families and that we would get along harmoniously together. At least I hope it would work out if that situation comes about. I think it would be best for both families together that we are not going to work it out if we run away from the problem. So we best remain there and try to work it out. I am ready for number nine.

If we did get married and were to raise our children do you think that we should explain and tell our children that we once had this religious difference or would we just bring them up in this new religion, that is their religion, that we talked about, and let them believe, that that is what we originally believed in?

EXPERIMENTER: May answer is no.

SUBJECT: Once again I kinda agree with this. I think they should be told because undoubtedly they will find out. And if they did find out that there was this difference that we once had they would feel that we were sneaking or trying to hide something from them and this would not be the best situation either. So I believe this would be the best situation. I am ready for number ten.

Do you feel that our children, if there were any, would have any religious problems themselves because of us the parents and our difficulties?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: Well I really don’t know if I agree with that or not. Perhaps they would have trouble if confusion set in and they were to feel that they did not know which is right and which is wrong or what side to pick if they did not want to stick with their religion. But I kinda feel that if their religion was a wholesome one which supplied the needs of a religion and that which a religion does supply that there would not be any problems with them. But I suppose that only time will tell if such problems would come about. I am finished with my comments now.

EXPERIMENTER: OK I will be right in.

The experimenter appeared in the room with the subject handed him a list of points that he might comment on, and left the room. The subject commented as follows.
SUBJECT: Well the conversation seemed to be one sided because I was doing it all. But, I feel that it was extremely difficult for Mr. McHugh to answer these questions fully without having a complete understanding of the personalities of the different people involved and exactly how involved the situation was itself. The answers I received I must say that the majority of them were answered perhaps in the same way that I would answer them to myself knowing the differences in type of people. One or two of them did come as a surprise to me and I felt that the reason perhaps he answered these questions the way he did is for the reason that he is not aware of the personalities involved and how they are reacting or would react to a certain situation. The answers that I received were most of them I felt that he was for the most part aware of the situation as we moved along in that I was interpreting his answers even though they were yes or no answers as fully meditating over these situations that I presented to him and they had a lot of meaning to me. I felt that his answers as a whole were helpful and that he was looking out for the benefit to the situation for the most part and not to curtail or to cut it short in any means. I heard what I wanted to hear in most of the situations presented at time. Perhaps I did not hear what I really wanted to hear but perhaps from an objective standpoint they were the best answers because someone involved in a situation is blinded to a certain degree and cannot take this objective viewpoint. And therefore these answers may differ from the person who is involved in the situation and the person who is outside and can take an objective viewpoint. I honestly believe that the answer that he gave me, that he was completely aware of the situation at hand. Perhaps I guess that should be qualified. Perhaps when I said should I talk to dad for instance he was not positive. When I said should I talk to dad for instance he was not positive what I was going to talk to dad about. In a full capacity. He know the general topic but he is not aware how close I am to dad or how involved the conversation might get. And if his saying “do talk” in knowing that dad will not listen well this perhaps isn't best, or if dad is very willing to listen he says it may not help. Or don’t talk. Well this once again is bringing in personalities which he is not aware of. The conversation and the answers given I believe had a lot of meaning to me. I mean it was perhaps what I would have expected from someone who fully understood the situation. And I feel that it had a lot of sense to me and made a lot of sense. Well I felt that the questions that I asked were very pertinent and did help in understanding the situation on both sides, that is myself and the answerer and my reaction to the answers like I have stated before were mostly in agreement. At times I was surprised but understood that because he is not fully aware of the situation and the personalities involved.

Here is another protocol.

Case 2:

SUBJECT: I would like to know whether or not I should change my major at the present time. I have a physics major with quite a deficit in grade points to bring up to get my C average in physics. I would like to switch over to mathematics. I have a little difficulty in it but I think maybe I
could handle it. I have failed several math courses here at U.C.L.A. but I have always repeated them and had C's. I have come close to getting a B in math in one specific course because I studied a little more than in others but my question is still should I change my major?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: Well he says no. And if I don't then I will have to make up my deficit in grade points which will be awfully difficult because I am not doing too well this semester. If I pull through this semester with 7 units of A then I can count on possibly going on to get my degree in physics in February but then I have this stigma of nuclear physics facing me. I thoroughly dislike the study of nuclear physics. Nuclear physics 124 will be one of my required courses to get a degree in physics.

Do you think I could get a degree in physics on the basis of this knowledge that I must take physics 124?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: He says yes. I don't see how I can. I am not that good of a theorist. My study habits are horrible. My reading speed is bad and I don't spend enough time in studying.

Do you think that I could successfully improve my study habits?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: He says I can successfully improve my study habits. I have been preached to all along on how to study properly but I don't study properly. I don't have sufficient incentive to go through in physics or do I?

Do you think I have sufficient incentive to get a degree in physics?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: He says my answer is yes. I think possibly so if I didn't have a bad scholastic record behind me to follow me up. It would be awfully difficult to get that degree.

Do you think I could successfully do my studying while trying to keep happy relations at home with my wife and still get my work done. I don't do my studying well at school and I don't have much incentive to study when I am at home. But when my wife comes home I like to study. Yet this keeps us from doing things and whenever she doesn't do things it gets on my nerves because there is all this work piling up. Do you think I could successfully do my studying at home?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: He says no. I don't think so either.

Should I come to school every night after supper to do my studying?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.
SUBJECT: He says I shouldn’t come to school and study. Where should I go? Should I go to the library on campus to do my studying?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: He says I should go to the library to do my studying. Which library? They may not have all the references there that I may need but that is not always necessary. I need at least three more questions. Do you think I can develop sufficiently good study habits and incentive to actually achieve developing those habits such that I wouldn’t have to stay up late at night and not get the work done in the first place?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: He says no. I can’t develop the study habits properly to be able to pull myself through. If you don’t think that I can develop the proper study habits and carry them through to reach my goal do you on the basis of this still believe that I can get a degree in physics?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: According to that I won’t get a degree. What should I do? Are you still there?

EXPERIMENTER: Yes I am.

SUBJECT: If you don’t think I will make the,-achieve the necessary goal of improving my study habits and getting a degree in physics do you recommend that I quit school?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: He says I should quit school. Are you still there?

EXPERIMENTER: Yes.

SUBJECT: I have one more question. I would like to get a commission in the Air Force. I have completed the Air Force R. O. T. C. training program but to get a commission I need a degree. If I don’t get the degree the chances are very strong that I may not get the commission although there are in’s and out’s that there is still some possibility that I may still get a commission without a degree, although this is not desirable. The question is, will I get a commission in the Air Force?

EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: He says I will get a commission in the Air Force and that is what I am looking forward to, but will I ever get a degree? If I get a commission without a degree will I ever get a degree in anything?
EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: This leaves me somewhat unhappy although I don't really need a degree in the type of work that I desire to do. Are you there? Come back in.

The subject commented as follows.

Well as far as what I got from the conversation it is rather foolish for me to pursue my work any further as far as getting a degree in anything. Actually I have felt all along that the type of work I am interested in which is inventing is not something that requires a degree necessarily. It requires a certain knowledge of math and physics but it doesn't require a degree to do inventing. From the conversation I gather that I should just quit school and go ahead and get my commission but how I don't know. But it would be awfully nice to have a degree. That degree would be able to get me into other schools. Otherwise I will have the statement that I went through college but I never got out. I also get the impression that my study habits will never improve as much as I would like them to anyway. I will not get a degree. I will get a commission and it is fruitless for me to study either at home or at school. Especially in the evening. I wonder if I should do any studying at all, or if I should learn to do all my studying at school. What to do? I have the feeling that my parents would be very unhappy and also my wife's parents would be very unhappy if I never did get a degree or at least especially right now. I have the feeling that this past conversation is primarily an idea based on what one should have learned to do years ago that is as a growing child. To ask themselves questions and give himself an answer of some type, yes or no, and to think out reasons why either yes or no holds or might hold and upon the validity or the anticipation of the validity of that answer what one should do to accomplish his goal or just exist. I personally think I can do better in math than I can in physics. But I won't know until the end of the summer.

An examination of the protocols revealed the following:

(A) Getting through the exchange

None of the subjects had difficulty in accomplishing the series of ten questions, and in summarizing and evaluating the advice.

(B) Answers were perceived as “answers-to-questions”

1. Typically the subjects heard the experimenter’s answers as answers-to-the-question. Perceptually, the experimenter’s answers were motivated by the question.

2. Subjects saw directly “what the adviser had in mind.” They heard “in a glance” what he was talking about, i.e. what he meant, and not what he had uttered.

3. The typical subject assumed over the course of the exchange, and during the post-experimental interview, that the answers were advice to the problems, and that this advice as a solution to the problem was to be found via the answers.

4. All reported the “advice that they had been given” and addressed their appreciation and criticism to that “advice.”
(C) There were no pre-programmed questions. The next question was motivated by the retrospective-prospective possibilities of the present situation that were altered by each actual exchange.

1. No subject administered a pre-programmed set of questions.
2. Present answers altered the sense of previous exchanges.
3. Over the course of the exchange the assumption seemed to operate that there was an answer to be obtained, and that if the answer was not obvious, that its meaning could be determined by active search, one part of which involved asking another question so as to find out what the adviser “had in mind.”
4. Much effort was devoted to looking for meanings that were intended but were not evident from the immediate answer to the question.

5. The present answer-to-the-questions motivated the succeeding set of possibilities from among which the next question was selected. The next question emerged as a product of reflections upon the previous course of the conversation and the presupposed underlying problem as the topic whose features each actual exchange documented and extended. The underlying “problem” was elaborated in its features as a function of the exchange. The sense of the problem was progressively accommodated to each present answer, while the answer motivated fresh aspects of the underlying problem.

6. The underlying pattern was elaborated and compounded over the series of exchanges and was accommodated to each present “answer” so as to maintain the “course of advice,” to elaborate what had “really been advised” previously, and to motivate the new possibilities as the emerging features of the problem.

(D) Answers in search of questions

1. Over the course of the exchange subjects sometimes started with the reply as an answer and altered the previous sense of their question to accommodate this to the reply as the answer to the retrospectively revised question.
2. The identical utterance was capable of answering several different questions simultaneously, and of constituting an answer to a compound question that in terms of the strict logic of propositions did not permit either a yes or no or a single yes or no.
3. The same utterance was used to answer several different questions separated in time. Subject referred to this as “shedding new light” on the past.
4. Present answers provided answers to further questions that were never asked.

(E) Handling incomplete, inappropriate, and contradictory answers

1. Where answers were unsatisfying or incomplete, the questions were willing to wait for later answers in order to decide the sense of the previous ones.
2. Incomplete answers were treated by subjects as incomplete because of the “deficiencies” of this method of giving advice.
3. Answers that were inappropriate were inappropriate for “a reason.” If the reason was found, the sense of the answer was thereupon decided. If an answer made “good sense” this was likely to be what the answerer had “advised.”
4. When answers were incongruous or contradictory, subjects were able to continue by finding that the “adviser” had learned more in the meantime, or that he had decided to change his mind, or that perhaps he was not sufficiently
acquainted with the intricacies of the problem, or the fault was in the question so that another phrasing was required.

5. Incongruous answers were resolved by imputing knowledge and intent to the adviser.

6. Contradictories faced the subject with electing the real question that the answer answered which they did by furnishing the question with additional meanings that fit with the meanings “behind” what the adviser was advising.

7. In the case of contradictory answers much effort was devoted to reviewing the possible intent of the answerer so as to rid the answer of contradiction or meaninglessness, and to rid the answerer of untrustworthiness.

8. More subjects entertained the possibility of a trick that tested this possibility. All suspicious subjects were reluctant to act under the belief that there was a trick involved. Suspicions were quieted if the adviser’s answers made “good sense.” Suspicions were most unlikely to continue if the answers accorded with the subject’s previous thought about the matter and with his preferred decisions.

9. Suspicions transformed the answer into an utterance having the appearance of coincidental occurrence with the occasion of the questioner’s question. Subjects found this structure difficult to maintain and manage. Many subjects saw the sense of the answer “anyway.”

10. Those who became suspicious simultaneously, though temporarily, withdrew their willingness to continue.

(F) “Search” for and perception of pattern

1. Throughout, there was a concern and search for pattern. Pattern, however, was perceived from the very beginning. Pattern was likely to be seen in the first evidences of the “advice.”

2. Subjects found it very difficult to grasp the implications of randomness in the utterances. A predetermined utterance was treated as deceit in the answers instead of as an utterance that was decided beforehand and that occurred independently of the subject’s questions and interests.

3. When the possibility of deception occurred to the subjects, the adviser’s utterance documented the pattern of the deceit instead of the pattern of advice. Thus the relationship of the utterance to the underlying pattern as its document remained unchanged.

(G) Answers were assigned as scenic source

1. Subjects assigned to the adviser as his advice the thought formulated in the subject’s questions. For example, when a subject asked, “Should I come to school every night after supper to do my studying” and the experimenter said; “My answer is no,” the subject in his comments said, “He said I shouldn’t come to school and study.” This was very common.

2. All subjects were surprised to find that they contributed so actively and so heavily to the “advice that they had received from the advisor.”

3. Upon being told about the deception the subjects were intensely chagrined. In most cases they revised their opinions about the procedure to emphasize its inadequacies for the experimenter’s purposes (which they understood still to be exploration of means of giving advice).

(H) The vagueness of every present situation of further possibilities remained invariant to the clarification furnished by the exchanges of questions and answers
1. There was vagueness (a) in the status of the utterance as an answer, (b) in its status as an answer-to-the-question, (c) in its status as a document of advice with respect to the underlying pattern, and (d) in the underlying problem. While, after the course of an exchange, the utterances furnished “advice about the problem,” their function of advice also elaborated the entire scheme of problematic possibilities so that the overall effect was that of a transformation of the subject’s situation in which the vagueness of its horizons remained unchanged and “problems still remain unanswered.”

(I) In their capacity as members, subjects consulted institutionalized features of the collectivity as a scheme of interpretation

1. In their use of the documentary method subjects made specific reference to the social structures in deciding the sensible and warranted character of the adviser’s advice. Such references, however, were not made to any social structures whatever. In the eyes of the subject, if the adviser was to know and demonstrate to the subject that he knew what he was talking about, and if the subject was to consider seriously the adviser’s descriptions of his circumstances as grounds of the subject’s further thoughts and management of these circumstances, the subject did no permit the adviser, nor was the subject willing to entertain, any model of the social structures. References that the subject supplied were to social structures which he treated as actually or potentially known in common with the adviser. And then, not to any social structures known in common, but to normatively valued social structures which the subject as a collectivity member accepted as conditions that his decisions, with respect to his own sensible and realistic grasp of his circumstances and the “good” character of the adviser’s advice, had to satisfy. These social structures consisted of normative features of the social system seen from within which, for the subject, were definitive of his memberships in the various collectivities that were referred to.

2. Subjects gave little indication, prior to the occasions of use of the rules for deciding fact and non-fact, what the definitive normative structures were to which their interpretations would make reference. The rules for documenting these definitive normative orders seemed to come into play only after a set of normative features had been motivated in their relevance to his interpretive tasks, and then as a function of the fact that the activities of interpretation were underway.

3. Subjects presupposed known-in-common features of the collectivity as a body of common sense knowledge subscribed to by both. They drew upon these presupposed patterns in assigning to what they heard the adviser talking about, its status of documentary evidence of the definitive normative features of the collectivity settings of the experiment, family, school, home, occupation, to which the subject’s interest were directed. In the manner of a documentary reading these evidences and the collectivity features were referred back and forth to each other, with each elaborating and being thereby elaborated in its possibilities.

(J) Deciding warrant was identical with assigning the advice its perceivedly normal sense21

Through a retrospective-prospective review, subjects justified the “reasonable” sense and sanctionable status of the advice as grounds for managing their affairs. Its “reasonable” character consisted of its compatibility with normative orders of social structures presumed to be subscribed to
and known between them. The subject’s task of deciding the warranted character of what was being advised was identical with the task of assigning to what the adviser proposed (a) its status as an instance of a class of events; (b) its likelihood of occurrence; (c) its comparability with past and future events; (d) the conditions of its occurrence; (e) its place in a set of means-ends relationships; and (f) its necessity according to a natural (i.e. moral) order. The subjects assigned these values of typicality, likelihood, comparability, causal texture, technical efficacy, and moral requiredness while using the institutionalized features of the collectivity as a scheme of interpretation. Thus, the subject’s task of deciding whether or not what the adviser advised was “true” was identical with the task of assigning to what the adviser proposed its perceivedly normal values.

Perceivedly normal values were not so much “assigned” as managed. Through the work of documenting—i.e. by searching for and detecting pattern, by treating the adviser's answer as motivated by the intended sense of the question, by waiting for later answers to clarify the sense of previous ones, by finding answers to unasked questions — the perceivedly normal values of what was being advised were established, tested, revised, retained, restored; in a word, managed. It is misleading, therefore, to think of the documentary method as a procedure whereby the advice was admitted to membership in a common sense corpus in the same way that the rule of observation is a procedure whereby propositions are accorded membership in an ideal scientific corpus. Rather the documentary method developed the advice so as to be continually “membershipping” it.

The social structures known in common and the attitude of daily life

It was asserted that the reasonable character of the advice consisted for subjects in its managed compatibility with normative orders of social structures that they presumed were known between themselves and the adviser. But, by the procedures of the demonstration not only this assumed common order, but the sense of the advice, as well as the relationships between questions and answers were coincidental. Thus far, therefore, the knowledge that a subject had of the social environment, which environment includes his own inner experience of his actions in their course as well as himself as an object for himself and other, is still his personal knowledge. How is the common sense character to be accounted for if such an account must find the features of common sense social structures within the features of a scene known from the perspectival position of the subject?

Schutz’ findings from his researches on the constitutive phenomenology of the world known in common22 may be used to recommend a solution. The solution consists in this: the social structures known in common—the corpus of common sense knowledge of social structures—consists of propositions with particular features assigned to them by the presuppositions that Schutz referred to as the “attitude of life.”

After describing these presuppositions we shall list the features that these presuppositions assign to a corpus’ propositions to constitute their sense “known in common with others.”

The “attitude of daily life”

In a series of classical articles of sociological theory23 directed to the constitutive phenomenology of situations of daily life, Schutz described those presuppositions whereby scenic occurrences were assigned by an actor
the constituent meanings for him of the scene’s feature, “known in common with others.” In accordance with the program, attitude, and method of Husserlian phenomenology, Schutz sought the presuppositions and the corresponding environmental features intended by them that were invariant to the specific contents of actions and their objects. The list is not exhaustive. Further research should reveal others. Like any product of observation they have the provisional status of “so until demonstrated to be otherwise.”

1. Schutz finds that in everyday situations the “practical theorist” achieves an ordering of events while seeking to retain and sanction the presupposition that the objects of the world are as they appear. The person coping with everyday affairs seeks an interpretation of these affairs while holding a line of “official” neutrality toward the interpretive rule that one may doubt that the objects of the world are as they appear. The actor’s assumption consists in the expectation that relationship of undoubted correspondence exists between the particular appearance of an object and the intended-object-that-appears-in-this-particular-fashion. Out of the set of possible relationships between the actual appearances of the object and the intended object, as for example, a relationship of doubtful correspondence between the two, the person expects that the presupposed undoubted correspondence is the sanctionable one. He expects that the other person employs the same expectancy in a more or less identical fashion, and expects that just as he expects the relationship to hold for the other person, the other person expects it to hold for him.

2. Schutz refers to a second assumption as the person’s practical interest in the events of the world. The relevant features of events that his interest in them selects, carry along for the person as their invariant feature that they can actually and potentially affect the actor’s actions and can be affected by his actions. Under this presupposed feature of events, the accuracy of his orderings of events is assumed by the person to be tested and testable without suspending the relevance of what he knows as fact, supposition, conjecture, fantasy and the like by virtue of his bodily and social positions in the real world. Events, their relationships, their causal texture, are not for him matters of theoretic interest. He does not sanction the notion that in dealing with them it is correct to address them with the interpretive rule that he knows nothing, or that he can assume that he knows nothing “just to see where it leads.” In everyday situations, what he knows is an integral feature of his social competence. What he knows, in the way he knows it, he assumes personifies himself as a social object to himself as well as to others as a bona-fide member of the group. He sanctions his competence as a bona-fide member of the group as a condition for his being assured that his grasp of his everyday affairs is a realistic grasp.

3. Schutz described the time perspective of daily life. In his everyday activities the person reifies the stream of experience into “time slices” with the use of a scheme of temporal relationships that he assumes he and other persons employ in an equivalent and standardized fashion. The conversation that he is having consists for him not only of the events of his stream of experience, but of what was, or may be said at a time that is designated by the successive positions of the hands of the clock. The “sense of the conversation” is not only progressively realized through a succession of realized meanings of the thus-far accomplished course of the conversation.
but every “thus-far” is informed by its anticipations. Further, as of any Here-and-Now, as well as over the succession of Here-and-Nows, the conversation for him has both its retrospective and prospective significances. These include the as of Here-and-Now references to beginnings, duration, pacing, phasing, and termination. These determinations of the “inner time” of the stream of experiences he coordinates with a socially employed scheme of temporal determinations. He uses the scheme of standard time as a means of scheduling and coordinating his actions with those of others, of gearing his interests to those of others, and of pacing his actions to theirs. His interest in standard time is directed to the problems such specifications solve in scheduling and coordinating interaction. He assumes, too, that the scheme of standard time is entirely a public enterprise, a kind of “one big clock identical for all.”

There are other and contrasting ways of temporally punctuating the stream of experience so as to produce a sensible and known in common array of events in the “outer world.” When he is engaged in the activities of scientific theorizing, the person uses standard time as a device for constructing one out of alternative empirically possible worlds (assuming of course that the theorizer is interested in matters of fact). Thus, what would from his interests in the mastery of practical affairs involve the actor’s use of time to gear his interests to the conduct of others, is, for his interests as a scientific sociological theorist, a “mere” device for solving his scientific problem which consists of clearly formulating such programs of coordinated actions in the fashion of relationships of cause and effect. For another example of contrast, the interests in standard time are put aside as irrelevant in appreciating the events of the play. When he attends the social structures portrayed in a play like Ethan Frome the actor allows the lovers’ fate to come before, and as a condition for appreciating, the sequence of steps that led up to it.

4. Schutz describes the “et cetera” assumption. By this is meant the assumption that as events have occurred in the past, they will occur again in the future.

5. A further and closely related assumption is that the appearances of events can be intended again by the actor as a group of constituent appearances. Thereby, the constancy of the intended object throughout variations in actual appearances consists in its temporal identicality. The actor assumes that the intended object is the same object now as it was intended in the past and can be intended again in the future despite the facts of time sampling and changes of actual appearances.

6. The person assumes a commonly entertained scheme of communication. He is informed as to the sense of scenic events by a presupposed background of things that “Anyone like us knows.” He assumes such a background is used by himself and others in the manner of coding rules in terms of which the question of correct correspondence between the appearance of the object and the intended-object-that-appears-in-this-particularly-way is decided.

7. Schutz finds the “thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives.” This consists of two assumptions: (a) the assumption of the “interchangeability of standpoints,” and (b) the assumption of the “congruency of relevances.”

(a) By the assumption of the interchangeability of standpoints is meant that the person takes for granted, and assumes that the other person does the
same, that if they were to change places so that the other person’s Here-and-Now become the actor’s, and actor’s become the other person’s, that the actor would see events in the same typical way as does the other person, and the other person would see them in the same typical way as the actor.

Stated in another way, the person attends a situation that has as its “background” feature that, given the specific actual appearances of a scene, if each was to exchange places with the other that each would appreciate the scene in a more or less similar fashion. As the person attends the scene, the specific Here-and-Now appearances of the scene are different for him than they are for the other. The person knows this. But even while he knows this, his situation has at the same time for him its characteristic feature that what actually appears Here-and-Now is the-potential-appearance-it-has-for-the-other-person-if-the-two-were-to-exchange-positions. He assumes that what each actually sees can be potentially seen by both under an exchange of positions. This, Schutz finds, the person assumes that there are different appearances and assumes too, that these are due to different perspectival positions in a world that is identical for both. But this identical world, Schutz finds, is the accomplishment of the assumed possibility if interchangeability of positions, physical and social. The identical world is not simply “given” but is a managed product. As such it is subject to the vicissitudes of biological, physical, and social conditions under which the presupposed interchangeability can be entertained with manageable incongruity. Hence, the feature of a scene for the actor that it is the identical scene for him and the other person can be modified by modifying this presupposition, e.g. by a change of interest, by ceremonial arrangement, by such instrumental manipulations as brain surgery, drugs and the like. The identical world is guaranteed by the person’s “ability” to retain this presupposition under the contingencies imposed by the factual world. This point will be discussed further later in the paper.

(b) By the assumption of the congruency of relevances is meant that the person assumes, and assumes that the other person assumes also, that differences in perspective that the person assumes originate in his own and in the other person’s particular biographical situations are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of either, and that both have selected and interpreted the actually and potentially common objects and their features in an “empirically identical” manner that is sufficient for all their practical purposes.

8. The person assumes a particular “form of sociality.” Among other things, the form of sociality consists of the person’s assumption that some characteristic disparity exists between the “image” of himself that he attributes to the other person as that person’s knowledge of him, and the knowledge that he has of himself in the “eyes” of the other person. He assumes too that alterations of this characteristic disparity remains within his autonomous control. The assumption serves as a rule whereby the everyday theorist groups his experiences with regard to what goes properly with whom. There corresponds, thereby, to the common intersubjective world of communication unpublishedized knowledge which, in the eyes of the actor, is distributed among persons as grounds of their actions, i.e. as their motives or, in the radical sense of the term, their “interests” as constituent features of the social relationships of interaction. He assumes that there are matters that one person knows that he assumes others do not know. The ignorance of one party
consists in what another knows that is motivationally relevant to the first. Thereby, matters that are known in common are informed in their sense by the personal reservations, the matters that are selectively withheld. Thus the events of everyday situations are informed by this integral background of “meanings held in reserve,” of matters known about self and others that are none of somebody else’s business: in a word, the private life.

The definitive features of propositions which are members of the common sense corpus Each of the foregoing presuppositions assigns to a set of propositions a feature that the members of that set share. A common sense corpus is defined by the feature, attached to all members of that set, “known in common with any bona-fide member of the collectivity.” Schutz’ findings explicate the compound character of the feature “known in common.” Through his work this feature has been analyzed into several features that are the constituent meanings of “known in common.”

Whatever a proposition specifically proposes—whether it proposes something about the motives of persons, their histories, the distribution of income in the population, the conditions of advancement on the job, kinship obligations, the organization of an industry, the layout of a city, what ghosts do when night falls, the thoughts that God thinks—if the proposition has for the user the following additional features it is called a common sense proposition.

1. The sense assigned to the proposition by the user is, from his point of view, an assignment that he is required to make; the other person is required to make the same assignment of sense; and just as the user requires the same assignment to hold for the other persons he assumes that the other person requires the same of him.

2. From the user’s point of view, a relationship of undoubted correspondence is the sanctioned relationship between the depicted-aspects-of-the-intended-object and the intended-object-that-appears-in-this-depicted-aspect.

3. From the user’s point of view, the thing that is known, in the manner that it is known, can actually and potentially affect the knower’s actions and circumstances and can be affected by his actions and circumstances.

4. From the user’s point of view, the meanings of the propositions are the products of a standardized process of naming, reification, and idealization of the user’s stream of experiences, i.e. the products of the same language.

5. From the user’s point of view, the present sense of whatever the proposition proposes is a sense intended on previous occasions and that may be intended identically again on an indefinite number of future occasions.

6. From the user’s point of view the intended sense is retained as the temporally identical sense throughout the stream of experience.

7. From the user’s point of view, the proposition has as its contexts of interpretation:

(a) a commonly entertained scheme of communication consisting of a standardized system of signals and coding rules, and

(b) “What anyone knows,” i.e. a pre-established corpus of socially warranted propositions.

8. From the user’s point of view, the actual sense that the proposition has for him is the potential sense that it would have for the other person were they to exchange their positions.
9. From the user's point of view, to each proposition there correspond its meanings that originate in the user's and in the other person's particular biography. From the user's point of view such senses are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of either, for him, both have selected and interpreted the actual and potential sense of the proposition in an empirically identical manner that is sufficient for their practical purposes.

10. From the user's point of view there is a characteristic disparity between the publically acknowledged sense and the personal, withheld sense of the propositions, and this private sense is held in reserve. From the user's point of view the proposition means for the user and the other more than the user can say.

11. From the perceiver's point of view alterations of this characteristic disparity remains within the user's autonomous control.

The common sense corpus of fact

It is the case that what a proposition proposes is not a condition of membership in the ideal scientific corpus, whereas its feature that what it proposes has been observed is. Similarly, it is the case that what a proposition proposes is not a condition of membership in the common sense corpus, whereas its features that what it proposes would be seen by others if their positions were exchanged, that it sense is not assigned as a matter of personal preference but is to be found there by anyone, etc. i.e. the constituent features of “known in common with others,” are the conditions of membership.

The enumerated features, and not what the proposition proposes, define the common sense character of the propositions. These features are the critical conditions of the sanctionable use of propositions as grounds of further inference and action, i.e. of their status as factual propositions. Thus, if the following propositions are said to be members of the general common sense corpus- “Husbands provide the primary source of support for their families,” “If you jump in the water you’ll get wet,” “Most Jews are rich,” “Christ will come a second time” then this is equivalent to saying that for the users they exhibit the above eleven features.

For users, these attributed features are necessarily relevant ones. That is, they are invariantly presupposed, or better, invariantly understood features of what the users are talking about and what they know. Such attributed features inform the user about any particular asserted matter of social structure, but without their necessarily being a conscious part of the user’s deliberations. The attributions are “seen without being noticed” features of knowledge of social structures. Though they are demonstrably relevant to the sense that the person makes of what is known by himself and others around him, they are rarely attended by him. As Schutz points out,24 a “special motive” is required to bring them under review. The more is the setting of use institutionally regulated and routinized, the more does the user take such features of what is known in common for granted. Hence such features are critical not only to the purposes of this paper but to sociological inquiries generally, for a perennial task of sociological inquiries is to locate and define the features of their situations that persons, while unaware of, are nevertheless responsive to as required features.

Institutionalized fact

The attitude of daily life permits a general solution to the problem of the possibility of a world known in common, given the perspectival positions
of actors. In the general case, the corpus of common knowledge is determined by the features assigned to it by users who attend their situations in the manner of the attitude of daily life.

But when we apply this solution to our findings from the demonstration we encounter difficulties. The difficulties are these:

1. On the one hand, the subject assumed that the adviser would assess his circumstances as the subject did himself if the adviser knew as much about them as the subject did. But on the experimenter’s part great care was taken to prevent the subject from assessing the experimental situation as the experimenter did. What the subject treated as the answer to his question, the experimenter treated as the nth reply in a predecided sequence. Therefore, what was from the subject’s view, common knowledge, was one thing; common knowledge from the experimenter’s view was something else. If we accept the solution as it stands, the possibility remains open that this is a characteristic situation wherever persons stand in specific statuses to each other with specific interests in what each knows and expects the other know. It is not at all obvious that under these conditions a stable relationship between the two parties would not be possible. For example, consider the extensiveness of lying.

As the solution stands it permits us to say that for any situation of interaction the attitude of daily life will furnish for each of the parties the features of a situation known in common. But as long as the possibility remains unsettled that in any particular instance we might have a case involving the lies of the demonstration, we would be unable to specify which instance of the general case we were actually dealing with. In a word, the congruent character of what is known in common, i.e. the possibility of shared knowledge, remains unaccounted for.

2. When the experimenter told the subjects about the experiment, he told them carefully and at length. He knew during the exchanges that he was misleading them, that he was wrong to have misled them, and that he would later have to justify his conduct in terms that the subject would accept. When they were told of the experiment, the subjects, for their part, felt “let down”. Many of them complained of having been taken in; of having discussed their problems “for nothing”. When, in deciding the procedure, the experimenter considered the possibility that subjects would encounter contradictory answers, he anticipated as a matter of common knowledge that the subjects would see a deceit and refuse to continue. When subjects encountered contradictions they indeed considered the possibility of deceit, but found it difficult to act under this possibility as a conviction.

If, for subject and experimenter, the presuppositions were constitutive of a world known in common, the experimenter, in acting like a confidence man, saw through the subject’s presuppositions as though they were objects of theoretical interest, whereas the subjects used them as a set of ethics. From the subject’s side the community consisted of this: that what the adviser would see if they were to exchange places was the adviser’s serious efforts to give useable advice to a serious problem under the handicap of insufficient talk. For the experimenter the community consisted of this: that “what the subject would see if they were to exchange places was the subject’s acceptance of the adviser’s assurances that the adviser, though handicapped, would attempt to give usable advice to a serious problem”
was a device that the adviser had employed so that the subject’s candid remarks would meet the experimenters need for evidences of documentary work. The experimenter thereby had modified the presuppositions so that the technical requirements of an adequate solution to the investigative problem defined the ethical character of his conduct.

Is it then that either was entirely free to modify the presuppositions? If so, then why, when the experiment was explained, did subjects prefer to document the presence of deceit? They might as easily have treated the exchange “after all” as a series of coincidental occurrences of more physical utterances. Indeed, they were invited unsuccessfully to do so. On the experimenter’s side, why did he feel guilty?

The problem consists in this. Each was free to modify the presuppositions: the experimenter to transform his situation entirely into an object of theoretical concern, the subject to transform it into a play. Each was constrained. How then to account for the stability of the attitude? What constrained them?

3. The circumstances that were for the subject known in common were described by him through his remarks into the tape recorder. These propositions did not mean only and nothing beyond what they were talking about. Instead, they referred to their author as the person who, by virtue of generating them, was the person who knew what he was talking about. In their use of what was known in common, subjects thereby advanced to the adviser important claims about themselves. Telling the subjects that they had been subjects is an “experiment” amounted to the disclosure that they had been “nothing but subjects in an experiment”; that the adviser “after all” had not been concerned with the subject’s knowledge of his problem and that the claims about himself advanced with bona-fides had been inappropriate. Many subjects felt deflated and foolish.

From the present state of the solution there is no way of showing why the use of the corpus should have involved the subject in a situation in which his use of the corpus was the very device whereby his degradation was achieved.

By reviewing these difficulties we can list the properties that the solution must have. (a) It must somehow assign the common sense corpus the character of a legitimate order. (b) It must handle the shared character of common knowledge, (c) which must be a legitimate sharedness. (d) It must allow the modifiability of the presuppositions and allow this modifiability to be within the freedom of the person to exercise, but provide for constraints against such modifications. (e) It must relate the use of the corpus to the conditions of the user’s self respect in his capacity as a specific and legitimate member in the collectivity. Finally (f) whatever held in these respects for everyday knowledge would have to hold as well for scientific knowledge, and for both in their actual rather than in their ideal cases.

These conditions are met by the following provisions:

1. The common sense corpus is always and only constituted by the presuppositions of the attitude of daily life as enforceable ethical or moral maxims of conduct. A common sense corpus cannot be constituted by the attitude of daily life as a set of technical maxims. A corpus constituted by technical maxims alone would be a mere idealization of human knowledge without an empirical counterpart in the world of actual human activities.
Because the common sense corpus consists of knowledge of social structures in the course of its use, every instance of recognizable knowledge would be found to be contaminated by the knower’s having had to come to terms with practical circumstances.

2. The actor’s grasp of the corpus consists of his grasp of his obligated interests as a member of the collectivity. In the manner of his specific use of the corpus, the corpus provides itself the definition of these interests and their “obligated” character. The corpus, therefore, itself intends specific collectivity membership of the user. Where the corpus is constituted by these presuppositions as moral maxims, the corpus stands on the behalf of the user’s institutionalized membership. In such a case the attitude of daily life is enforced as a morality.

3. The common culture of any specific collectivity consists of the possible events of social structure which have for the member the constituent features of “known in common” which are assigned to these contents by the ethics of the attitude of daily life.

4. Since these features are invariant to the contents of these possible events; since they may be “detached” from one set and assigned to another; and since only a fraction of what persons are agreed to as the relevant features of their situations consist of the features displayed through actual appearances, the possibility of “shared knowledge” can not possibly consist in the observed agreement among users on contents, whether these agreements by ascertained via perceptual displays, questionnaires, or the exquisitely intensive conversations between psychotherapists and patients. Persons show each other a little and trust each other to know “the rest.” The possibility of shared knowledge consists instead and entirely in the enforceable character of the attitude of daily life as an ethic.

5. The legitimate collectivity member is obligated to a grasp of the common sense corpus. Its use, therefore, is a condition of membership and a condition of self respect. The corpus in use is itself a sign of, points to, stands on the behalf of the bona-fide character of the user’s specific collectivity membership.

6. By its use the user not only asserts his claims to bona-fide membership but gives evidence of this bona-fide membership.

7. Let the term “collectivity member’s competence” refer to the person’s rights to manage on his own the decisions of sensibility, objectivity, and warrant. Such rights are accorded him by virtue of legitimate collectivity membership. His actual competence consist of the probability that such rights are enforceable. His competence is guaranteed by his and others motivated compliance in the use of the possible events of social structure i.e. the world known in common, as a legitimate scheme of interpretation in deciding sensibility, objectivity, and warrant.

8. To speak of bona-fide membership means that a member’s competence is taken for granted.

9. If the ethic of the attitude of daily life is the common culture, i.e. if this ethic is the maxim that governs exchanges in a collectivity, then as long as bona-fide status is mutually acknowledged, this mutual acknowledgement is expressed by the fact that the members take each other’s word for what is stated as a matter of fact, and that they share in the use of such matters of fact while knowing very well that there is no way of
checking up. Indeed, by the very terms of the ethic, they are constrained from checking up.

10. Hence, all arguments on matters of fact are necessarily addressed to the question of competence, and thereby are necessarily addressed as well to the question of bona-fide membership. Insofar as arguments on matters of fact occur while the constancy of competence is maintained, such effects must be the consequence of facilitating social mechanisms. Such mechanisms would be restorative and corrective of normative distributions in the environment of bona-fide membership. Prominently “checking up” would either involve ceremonial management, or would be conducted secretly. Where arguments of fact among bona-fide members are concerned, “checking up” involves not only as a prior condition for undertaking the check out, and as a condition for legitimizing it, but as a consequence of the check out, a degrading of the status of the person whose “word” is being questioned.

11. All of the above holds for all types of public discourses including scientific discourse.

The foregoing discussions of the common sense corpus and the documentary method may now be summarized in the form of two rules of sociological investigative procedure.

1. With regard to the corpus of common sense knowledge:

Propositions are constituted as members of the common sense set by the following rule: Irrespective of what a proposition proposes, it is a member of the common sense corpus if its use as correct grounds of inference and action is, for a user, a condition of his bona-fide status in a collectivity. Since by their use the user not only asserts his claim to bona-fide membership, but provides for other members evidence of his bona-fide membership in the collectivity, this rule can be loosely restated: propositions whose use is governed by the user’s expectation that he will be socially supported for using them, will be called common sense propositions.

2. With regard to the role of the documentary method in deciding fact:

Given complex situations of choice, whenever the documentary method is used, the interpreter’s task of deciding the factual character of a proposition is identical with his task of assigning what a proposition proposes its values of typicality, likelihood, causal texture, technical efficacy, and moral requiredness while using the normatively known-in-common features of the collectivity i.e. the institutionalized features of the collectivity, as a scheme of interpretation.

Some logical properties of the common sense corpus

When the set of propositions constituted by these rules are examined, several logical properties of the set appear. We find such propositions in a multitude of everyday and professional occasions such as the accounts that friends give of a journey, in a psychiatrist’s assessment at Grand Rounds of the course and state of his patient’s illness, or a minister’s account of why misfortune strikes. They occur as well in all domains of scientific work. They abound in the published accounts of sociological research.

Occasional expressions. Prominently and characteristically the sense of propositions in common sense sets is delivered through the use of what Edmund Husserl referred to as “occasional expressions.” Occasional expressions are those whose sense cannot be decided by an auditor without his necessarily knowing or assuming something about the biography and the purposes of the user of the
expression, the circumstances of the utterance, the previous course of the conversation, or the particular relationship of actual or potential interaction that exists between the expressor and the auditor. Occasional expressions are to be contrasted with expressions whose references are decided by consulting a set of coding rules that are assumed to hold irrespective of the characteristics and biography of the user. Kaufmann calls these “objective expressions.” Rules of grammatic English usage, or Webster’s dictionary, or the definitions laid down at the beginning of a scientific paper, or the basic rules of chess, or the rule of Morse code, are for persons who seek to govern their conduct by these rules, rules that constitute a set of terms as a set of objective expressions.

The designata of occasional expressions vary by their occasion of use. They do not have a sense that remains identical throughout the changing occasions of their use, and that are invariant to circumstances. Quite the contrary. They require for the appreciation of their sense specific reference to circumstances. In this exceedingly important respect such expressions stand in marked comparison with those of mathematical discourse where a term, once defined, is presumed to mean the same thing irrespective of the passage of time, further experience, and practical circumstances. An expression, once introduced into mathematical discourse has the peculiar property that its sense remains identical throughout the occasion of its repeated use. The user is expected to know this identical sense and to act on the basis of it irrespective of whether it is or is not introduced again. The contrasting use of occasional expressions may be illustrated in the story of the groom who turns to his newly wed wife as soon as the ceremony is finished and says: “I love you. My terms are defined in Webster’s dictionary. Please remember what I have just said because I am not going to tell you again.”

That persons in the course of ordinary conversation can convey information to each other without undue loss, distortion, misrepresentation, or misunderstanding, or that they can sustain a line of concerted interaction with each other while using “occasional expressions” means that they subscribe to the “unstated common understandings” that “any person like Us” could be assumed to know in a more or less similar and typical way. The possibility of continuous discourse that involves small amounts of incongruity or error means that persons converse though the use of occasional expressions by employing as tacit schemes of interpretation and expression such matters as assumed mutual biographies, or various stereotyped notions about the regularities of group life that persons assume govern their participation with their fellow conversationalists. The interactions of husband and wives are notorious for the extent of occasional expressions in their discourse. The ambiguities, uncertainties, and anxieties that accompany the attempt to codify and rationalize these tacit understandings have been documented in studies of communication difficulties in larger scale organization, and in studies of executive succession, worker turnover, swift size increase, organizational rearrangements in the form of reallocation of duties and shifts in personnel composition of work groups, and the like.

Since everyday discourse is the place where occasional expressions abound, their presence in sociological discourse is of particular importance in a study of ethnomethodological features of sociological inquiry. Their presence points immediately to the possibility of routinized, collectivity governed,
stable interactions between sociologists are critical conditions that sociologists actually consult and require each other to consult in assigning sensibility and warrant to each others reports.

Sanctioned vagueness. The empirical constructions in a common sense corpus have as another important logical property that they are specifically vague in their reference to phenomena of social life. By “specifically vague” is meant that these constructions do not frame a clearly restricted set of possible occurrences and that vagueness in these constructions is expected and sanctioned as a condition of bona-fide membership.

Not only are the empirical possibilities vague in referring to intended determinations of time, place, and attributes, but the set of possibilities I without a boundary. The set is “open” with respect to internal relationships, relationships to other sets, and in their retrospective and prospective references. The objects depicted in common sense propositions have as an essential feature, - that is to say, the depicted objects include as their invariantly intended and sanctioned features, an accompanying “fringe” or “surplus” of meaning.

Within the rules of formal discourse, this property is counted as an unfortunate error. By contrast, attempts to remedy this feature in common sense discourse by “cutting away the fringe” through, for example, insisting that discourse abide by the ideals of rational clarity, consistency, and literalness, is commonly experienced by interactants as a withholding or withdrawal solidarity, affection, and approval. The person who insists on such canons for the use of propositions in conducting his everyday interactions may be treated as unreasonable, a pedant, a boor, a show off, impractical, disloyal, otherwordly, obstinate, egotistic, distrustful, lacking in common sense in the sense that he is an outsider to the normative order of the group that defines how one must talk if he is to fulfill his obligations to be understood and be entitled to be understood. He is a person who does not appreciate reasonable discourse; a person who does not engage in “plain talk.”

To summarize the point: not only are the intended objects vague in their reference but the vagueness as an invariantly intended feature of these objects is also a socially sanctioned vagueness.

“Pretense of agreement.” In conveying “matters known in common,” persons convey them while entertaining as a legitimate expectation that the other person will understand. The speaker expects that the other will assign to his remarks the sense intended by the speaker, and that thereby the other will permit the speaker the assumption that both know what he is talking about without any requirement of a check-out. Thus the sensible character of the matter that is being discussed is settled by a fiat assignment that each makes to the other, that as a condition of competent membership each will have furnished whatever unstated understandings are required. Much therefore of what is being talked about is not mentioned, although each expects that the adequate sense of the matter that is being talked about is settled. Edward R. Rose has suggested that this legitimate expectation of understanding be called the “pretense of agreement.”

That the expected use of occasional expressions, expected vagueness, and expected pretense of agreement are socially sanctioned such that breaches call forth immediate attempts to restore the desirable state of affairs may be illustrated in the results of the following procedure.
Students in the author's course, Sociopathic Behavior, were instructed to engage a person in an ordinary conversation and, without indicating that what the experimenter was saying was in any way out of the ordinary, to insist that the person clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks. Twenty-three students reported twenty-five instances of such encounters. The following are typical excerpts from their accounts.

Case 1. The subject was telling the experimenter, a member of the subject's car pool, about having had a flat tire while going to work the previous day.

(S) I had a flat tire.

(E) What do you mean, you had a flat tire?

“She appeared momentarily stunned. Then she answered in a hostile way:

‘What do you mean, ‘What do you mean?’ A flat tire is a flat tire.
That is what I meant. Nothing special. What a crazy question!’”

Case 2.

(S) Hi, Ray. How is your girlfriend feeling?

(E) What do you mean, how is she feeling? Do you mean physical or mental?

(S) I mean how is she feeling? What’s the matter with you? (He looked peeved.)

(E) Nothing. Just explain a little clearer what do you mean?

(S) Skip it. How are your Med School applications coming?

(E) What do you mean, ‘How are they?’ ”

(S) You know what mean.

(E) I really don’t.

(S) What’s the matter with you? Are you sick?

Case 3.

On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My husband remarked that he was tired. I asked, “How are you tired? Physically, mentally, or just bored?”

(S) I don’t know, I guess physically, mainly.

(E) You mean that your muscles ache, or your bones?

(S) I guess so. Don’t be so technical.

(After more watching)

(S) All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedstead in them.

(E) What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the ones you have seen?

(S) What’s the matter with you? You know what I mean.

(E) I wish you would be more specific.

(S) You know what I mean! Drop dead!

Case 4.

During a conversation (with the E’s female fiancée) the E questioned the meanings of various words used by the subject….. “For the first minute and a half the subject responded to the questions as if they were legitimate inquiries. Then she responded with “Why are you asking me these questions?”
and repeated this two or three times after each question. She became nervous and jittery, her face and hands movements...uncontrolled. She appeared bewildered and complained that I was making her nervous and demanded that I “Stop it!”... The subject picked up a magazine and covered her face. She put down the magazine and pretended to be engrossed. When asked why she was looking at the magazine she closed her mouth and refused any further remarks.

Case 5.

“My friend said to me, ‘Hurry or we will be late.’ I asked him what did he mean by late and from what point of view did it have reference. There was a look of perplexity and cynicism on his face. ‘Why are you asking me such silly questions. Surely I don’t have to explain such a statement. What is wrong with you today? Why should I have to stop to analyze such a statement. Everyone understands my statements and you should be no exception.’”

Case 6.

“The victim waved his hand cheerily.”

(S) How are you?
(E) How am I in regard to what? My health, my finance, my school work, my peace of mind, my......
(S) (Red in the face and suddenly out of control.) Look! I was just trying to be polite. Frankly, I don’t give a damn how you are.

Case 7. (Two Japanese males)

“My friend and I were talking about a man whose overbearing attitude annoyed us. My friend expressed his feeling.”

(S) I’m sick of him.
(E) Would you explain what is wrong with you that you are sick?
(S) Are you kidding me? You know what I mean.
(E) Please explain your ailment.
(S) (He listened to me with a puzzled look.) What came over you?
We never talk this way, do we?

Case 8.

Apparently as a casual afterthought, my husband mentioned Friday night, “Did you remember to drop off my shirts today?”
Talking nothing for granted, I replied, “I remember that you said something about it this morning. What shirts did you mean, and what did you mean by having them ‘dropped’ off?” He looked puzzled, as though I must have answered some other question that the one asked.

Instead of making the explanation he seemed to be waiting for, I persisted, “I thought your shirts were all in pretty good shape; why not keep them a little longer?” I had the uncomfortable feeling I had overplayed the part.

He no longer looked puzzled, but indignant. He repeated, “A little longer! What do you mean, and what have you done with my shirts?”
I acted indignant too. I asked, “What shirts? You have sport shirts, plain shirts, wool shirts, regular shirts, and dirty shirts. I’m no mind reader. What exactly do you want?”

My husband again looked confused, as though he was trying to justify my behavior. He seemed simultaneously to be on the defensive and offensive. He assumed a very patient, tolerant air, and said, “Now, let’s start all over again. Did you drop off my shirts today?”

I replied, “I heard you before. It’s your meaning I wish was more clear. As far as I am concerned dropping off your shirts— which ever shirts you mean— could mean giving them to the Goodwill, leaving them at the cleaners, at the laundromat, or throwing them out. I never know what you mean with those vague statements.”

He reflected on what I said, then changed the entire perspective by acting as though we were playing a game, that it was all a joke. He seemed to enjoy the joke. He ruined my approach by assuming the role I thought was mine. He then said, “Well, let’s take this step by step with ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers: Did you see the dirty shirts I left on the kitchenett, yes or no?”

I could see no way to complicate his question, so felt forced to answer ‘yes.’

In the same fashion, he asked if I picked up the shirts; if I put them in the car; if I left them at the laundry; and if I did all these things that day, Friday. My answers were, yes.

The experiment, it seemed to me, had been cut short by his reducing all the parts of his previous question to their simplest terms, which were given to me as if I were a child unable to handle any complex questions, problems, or situations.

Retrospective-prospective sense. The sense of propositions that make up the corpus is commonly arrived at through a retrospective-prospective appreciation of their meanings. This means that as of any present moment of an exchange, the sense of the matter being referred to is decided by an auditor by assuming not only what has been said so far but what will have been said in the future course of the utterances. Such sets of propositions require of the auditor that he assume, as of any present accomplished point in the interaction, that by waiting for what the other person says at a later time the present significances of what has already been said or done will have been clarified. Such propositions have the property of being progressively realized through the further course of the interaction.

The foregoing properties may be summarized by saying that the propositions of the common sense corpus do not have a sense that is independent of the occasions under which they are used.

Further properties of the set may be briefly mentioned.

The propositions that comprise common sense accounts typically are unwritten, uncodified, and are passed on from one person to a successor through a system of apprenticeship in their use. Various social psychological researches have demonstrated the sense of a proposition to be a function of the place of the proposition is a serial order; of the expressive character of the terms that comprise it; of the socially acknowledged importance of the events that are depicted; of the relevance of what is being referred to, to the need dispositions of the user, to mention a few.
Their sense is structurally equivocal being dependent upon the developing course of the occasions of their use. Like a conversation their sense is built up step by step over the actual course of references to them.

As of any present state of affairs, the sense of what a proposition now proposes includes the anticipated, though sketchily known, future further references that will have accrued to it. Its present sense for a user is informed by the user’s willingness to continue in the progressive realization of its sense by further elaboration and transformation. This feature is commonly referred to as the “spirit” of the proposition.

The relevance of the previous arguments for sociological research and theory
Examples of the use of the documentary method can be cited from every area of sociological investigation. Its obvious application occurs in community studies where warrant is assigned to statements by the criteria of “comprehensive description” and “ring of truth.” Its use is found also on the many occasions of survey research when the researcher in reviewing his interview notes or in editing the answers to a questionnaire has to decide “what the respondent had in mind.” When a researcher is addressed to the “motivated character” of an action, or a theory, or a person’s compliance to a legitimate order and the like he will use what he has actually observed to “document” an “underlying pattern.” The documentary method is used whenever selected features of an object are used to epitomize the object. For example, just as the lay person may say of something that “Harry” says, “Isn’t that just like Harry,” the investigator may use some observed feature of the thing he is referring to as a characterizing indicator of the intended matter. Complex scenes like industrial establishments or social movements are frequently described with the aid of “excerpts” from protocols and numerical tables which are used to epitomize the intended events. The documentary method is used whenever the investigator constructs a life history or a “natural history.” The task of historicizing the person’s biography consists of using the documentary method to select and order past occurrences so as to furnish the present state of affairs its relevant past and prospects.

The use of the documentary method is not confined to cases of “soft” procedures and “partial descriptions.” It occurs as well in cases of rigorous procedures where descriptions are intended to exhaust a definite field of possible observables. In reading a journal account for the purposes of literal replication, researchers who attempt to reconstruct the relationship between the reported procedure and the results frequently encounter a gap of insufficient information. The gap occurs when the reader asks how the investigator decided the correspondence between what was actually observed and the intended event for which the actual observation is treated as its evidence. The reader’s problem consists of having to decide that the reported observation is a literal instance of the intended occurrence, i.e. that the actual observation and the intended occurrence are identical in sense. Since the relationship between the two is a sign relationship, the reader must consult some set of grammatical rules to decide this correspondence. This grammar consists of some theory of the intended events on the basis of which the decisions to code the actual observations as findings are recommended. It is at this point that there frequently occurs an investment of interpretive work and an assumption of matters “just known in common.” Correct correspond-
ence is apt to be meant and read on reasonable grounds. Correct correspondence is the product of the work of investigator and reader as members of a community of co-believers. Thus even in the case of rigorous methods, if a researcher is to recommend, and the reader is to appreciate, published findings as members of the corpus of sociological fact, the documentary method is employed.

It is perhaps more obvious that complex situations, the documentary method, and the corpus of common sense fact are more characteristic of the situations of choice of housewives and businessmen than they are of clinical psychiatry, and perhaps these features apply more obviously to the inquiries of clinical psychiatry than they apply to the inquiries of the more rigorous branches of sociological research. Even if it is demonstrable that these features are present, let alone prominent, in the situations of all three, is it not nevertheless true that a situation of inquiry might receive such documentary treatment and still the logical status of its products would be decided differently? For example, is it not the case that there are strictures against ex post facto analysis? And is it not so that a field worker who learned after he consulted his notes what problems he had “in the final analysis” obtained answers to, might reapply for a grant to perform a “confirmatory study” of the “hypotheses” that his reflections had yielded? Is there therefore any necessary connections between the features of complex situations of choice, the use of documentary method, and the corpus of sociological fact. Must the documentary method necessarily be used by the sociologist to decide sensibility, objectivity, and warrant?

The ease with which examples of the documentary method can be cited in various areas of sociological investigation suggests that a formal proof exists to demonstrate a necessary connection between the theoretical subject matter of sociology, as this is laid down in the rules of the sociological attitude and the conception of a social order of phenomena constituted by the rules of “sociological seeing” on the one hand, and the canons of adequate description, i.e. evidence, on the other. Although examples are easily cited for the presence of documentary work in sociological methods, the problem of demonstrating the necessary character of its presence remains unsolved.

However if such a proof is possible, it could be obtained by proceeding as follows:

First, if it can be shown that there is any situation of sociological inquiry that has from the point of view of the investigator, the properties of a situation of perfect information, then on the face of it the proof is impossible. Thus if any situation of sociological inquiry can demonstrated in principle (we put technological difficulties aside as mere encumberances) to conform essentially to a game of chess then the use of the documentary method represents nothing more than a failure of wit on the investigator’s part.

The necessity of the documentary method can be demonstrated therefore only if all situations of sociological inquiry are essentially situations of incomplete information.

This however would not be sufficient. To the extent that poker players treat the rules of play as maxims of conduct the game is for them necessarily one of incomplete information. Nevertheless, a poker player, without breaching the rules, may still decide prior to the actual play upon a set of strategies that he will follow irrespective of what the others are doing, give no thought
to what they intend to do, and not be interested at all in how the present state of affairs developed. Hence, although the basic rules of poker play provide a situation of incomplete information, he can still construct a model of play that will describe its features and outcomes. Therefore, and again, his use of the documentary method would represent nothing more than a failure of wit.

The poker player can of course transform his situation into one in which the documentary method comes into use. But he can of course always change it back again. Therefore, if situations of sociological inquiry are demonstrably situations of incomplete information but nothing more, this is insufficient and the proof is not possible.

However, there is another game that throws light on the problem. I refer to double blind chess, “kriegsspiel.” In kriegsspiel to the extent that players treat the basic rules of play as maxims of conduct the present state of the game always and only means the state-of-the-game-as-it-has-developed-thus-far. Rational play requires that the player orient a present state of the game that has this peculiar time structure. This is so because it is impossible for the kriegsspiel player to grasp the basic rules of play without assigning to his opponent the features of a typical player which features are drawn from a knowledge of social structures outside of the game. Hence the possibility of play, and thereby the possibility of recognizing the events of game play, and thereby the possibility of rationality in play requires the player to orient his situation as a complex situation such as we described earlier in this paper. Hence, the time structure of the present state of the game depends only on the fact that he plays according to the basic rules. If he does not make these assumptions- if he chooses to act like the previously mentioned poker player,- he can still obtain a description of the game and its outcomes but it can never be better than a partial description. And if his opponent follows the other procedure, the opponent’s “grasp” of the conditions of play and their outcomes will be better. Hence, in this case the lack of wit is remedied by addressing the essential non-calculable character of each present state of the game. The “good” player can therefore make of his present situation one which acquires an historical character so that the “with-respect-to-the-player’s-position-the-position-that-his-opponent-has” is a feature of every present state of his circumstances that his methods of assessment are intended to yield him.

Now, empirically, the work of the documentary method is a prominent feature of assessments that kriegsspiel players make and indeed is one of the attractions of the game. Evidence of its presence is found in the advice that kriegsspiel players furnish novices: “unless you know how to talk during the game, keep your mouth shut”; “if for any reason you must leave the game, suspend play until you return; do not permit anyone to continue in your place.”

Although the tie between the documentary method and the kriegsspiel player’s grasp of the present state of the game is easily illustrated, the necessary tie is so far without a proof. However, it is possible to state what has to be proved. It is this: that the non-calculable character of the situations of the game can not be appreciated by the player without attending it with the use of the documentary method. It would have to be demonstrated that his best grasp of the situation- i.e. rational play- is identical in sense with a grasp of the game as a documented situation, i.e.
as the product of the documentary method. Conversely, it would have to be demonstrated that any attempt to retain the product without the work of documentation must anomicize his grasp and produce thereby an impoverished description of the present state of play.

If it is possible to prove that in a situation of imperfect information where the event that is being assessed is a temporal object, that the documentary method is necessary for a best grasp of the event, then the next task in the proof is in order. If not, the proof is impossible inasmuch as the possibility exists that there is more than one way to skin this cat even though the alternative is not known.

It is necessary next to show that all events of sociological concern are cultural events, i.e. evaluated events. By this is meant that the intended event always stands to the observation in a sign relationship. Hence there is the possibility that this sign relationship, which is a relationship of correspondence between the two may be one of either evidence or representation. Correct correspondence is assigned by a set of rules in terms of which correct correspondence is defined. In the case where these rules define the possible states of the game in a literal way the relationship of evidence is only a problem in technology and the possibility of the necessary character of documentary work must be abandoned. Such a state of affairs in kriegsspiel, for example, would assume, however, that the player could decide the significance of the referee’s remark for his knowledge of the present state of the game by invoking a theory of his opponent’s course of play, and that means of how his opponent is at least likely to respond to every intended move that he takes and vice versa. This is necessary if he is to interpret the opponent’s “remark” conveyed through the referee’s remark without ambiguity. But it is precisely the feature of the game that these rules include not only the known rules of play but the imputations of typical play that are known from outside the game. The coding rules are essentially ambiguous. The proof is as follows.

Even if the opponent gives a player full information about his biography and plans of play, the player must decide while the game is underway the truth of what the other tells him by consulting its fit with his knowledge of the present state of the game as it has developed thus far. If it does not fit, he can believe his opponent by assuming that the further course of the game will demonstrate the correctness of the decision that the player must take now to act on the basis of it. If it does fit, he can believe that his opponent is giving him a line in order the better to secure later advantages for himself.

In either case the present sense of the opponent’s remark therefore remains to be found out later for what it was all along. If the player takes his opponent’s self description at face value as a definite lie or definite truth he risks the position of the poker player, unless he can be assured that his opponent too will take the player’s own self descriptions at face value as either a definite lie or a definite truth. But to get this agreement both must engage in a further process of exchange in which the identical considerations are up for decision that operated at the time that the original exchange of biography and plans was made, and thus there is a matter of an infinite regress. If one player accepts the word of the other while the opponent does not reciprocate, then the one who takes the other at face value as liar or truth teller plays the game in the fashion of the poker
player, and must therefore have nothing better than a partial description of
the game since if his opponent follows the other procedure the opponent's
descriptions of the conditions of play and their outcome will be better than
the player's.

Hence the coding rules for the case of rational play are essentially
ambiguous.

We return now to the task of showing that all the events of sociological
concern are cultural events.

All actual events stand to the intended events as their representatives.
This signify the intended event. The kriegsspiel player draws upon an
especially ambiguous grammar to assign their likely referent. The player
may transform his situation so as to attend the referee's utterance as meaning
only itself. In such a case he knows clearly and rigorously what the referee
said but he does not know what he said about the game. Similarly he can

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attend the referee's utterance according to the grammar of the English language,
or a pleasant conversation, or a demonstration of double-blind chess when
players and referee are being instructed in the game, but then he knows what
the referee said in a different game, not in the one at hand.

If it can be shown that all sociological events are evaluated or judged
events- cultural events- and thereby require for their sense reference to
the observer's theory of social structure, part of which is known from outside
the situation of inquiry, to decide the correspondence between the observed
occurrence and the intended event; then given that it might have been demon-
strated that this correspondence is decided in terms of a theory of a situation
known in a non-calculable way, the next step in the problem would require
the proof that all cultural events are temporal objects.

It is possible to show that every object of sociological inquiry can be
conceived as a temporal object. The proof resides in the ordinary fact that
any sociological event can be conceived in terms of the processes whereby the
intended phenomenon, as the product of these processes, is "assembled." Conceived
in this way the phenomenon would acquire as its essential feature a reference
to a succession of occurrences. By attaching this feature to the investigator's
situation of investigation his situation on the way through an observation
would have the character, as of any present state of affairs, of an occurrence
whose character will have been decided by some future contingency. However,
if he selects a terminal criterion, then although whenever he is asked he might
not be able to say what happened, what happened, by waiting out the terminal occurrence he
would then be prepared to describe the assembled event and without respect for
the processes of its assembly.

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But, given the fact that the character of the occurrence is initially
defined in terms of the procedure of the inquiry, i.e. the processes of its
assembly, the question immediately arises: given that the occurrence is
defined in terms of the processes of its assembly, what are the conditions
under which the investigator could intend the product without reference to
its assembled character. If such conditions were demonstrable in any situ-
ations of sociological inquiry no proof of necessity would be possible.

To grasp these conditions consider for illustration the case of a rate,
any rate of sociological interest- a rate of crime, birth, death, suicide, or
whatever. For the proof to succeed it must demonstrate that the rate is in
every case essentially a time object. By essentially a time object is meant
that the constituent meanings of “the rate” involve temporal structures of the identical sort seen in the events of the present state of the game in kriegsspiel. The critical feature and specific formal property of a time object is this: that over the course of its assembly every present character would be informal by its future possible outcome.

Consider a crime rate. In order to guarantee that it is not a temporal object it is enough to demonstrate that its meaning is invariant to the different procedural sequences for its assembly. But if the procedural sequences for its assembly are constituent meanings of the rate, then it is a temporal object. If each of the different procedural sequence for its assembly have as their products a different event as the “assembled rate,” then the crime rate as a temporal object will have been demonstrated since all sociological events depend for their warrant upon the procedures whereby they are produced.

It would then be necessary to show that the rate as a temporal object is necessarily related to the problem of social order. This would be done by first showing that the sociological concept of the problem of social order is identical with the sociological concept of structural analysis. It would then follow that the tasks of adequate description of any actual social structure are constituent tasks in the problem of social order. Since the method for describing a social structure like a suicide rate consists of the program for the rate’s production, the method for assembling the rate is necessarily related to the problem of social order as the solution to one of its constituent tasks.

Since the proof could not be accomplished without the experimental demonstration of its arguments, a successful proof would have the important consequences of establishing the conditions under which the use of experimentation in sociological inquiry as rigorous and literal schemes of inference is possible.

If the proof succeeded, an additional important consequence would be to have prepared the ground for the development of a mathematics appropriate to the literal description of the fundamental occurrences of the sociological program. These fundamental occurrences would be cultural events as time objects. From the actor’s point of view they would be known to him in common sense situations and in a common sense way. For the sociological observer the tasks of structural analysis would consist of the tasks of programming a set of actors whose concerted actions taken in common sense situations are the operations that are required to produce the society whose features conform to the empirical features that the sociologist is interested in accounting for. The mathematics appropriate to this conception would consist of the mathematics of practical actions. Thus far sociology has for the most part confined its efforts to the use and development of a mathematics of activities that are assigned by the sociological theorist the rational properties of strict scientific theorizing. Thus far many persons have expressed dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, but there are few remedies.

Some modifications of the attitude of daily life and their research consequences

The attitude of daily life furnishes the actor his “definition” of the situation as an environment of social realities known in common, i.e. the “common culture.” It is constitutive of the institutionalized common under-
standings of the practical everyday organization and workings of the society as seen “from within.” Modifications of its presuppositions must thereby modify the real environments of the society’s members. Such modifications transform one socially defined environment of real objects into another environment of real objects.

One such modification includes its being learned. This involves for the neonate the growth of a world and the progressively enforced and enforceable compliance of the “developing member” to the attitude of daily life as an ethic or a morality.

Another modification consists of the ceremonial transformation of one environment of real objects into another such as occurs in the cases of play, theatre-going, religious conversion, “conventionalization,” and scientific inquiry. It is of interest that if for each of these cases one asks where does the person “go” or where is he “called back to” when he “stops playing” or is admonished to “stop playing,” or “leaves the theatre” or is admonished to “stop acting and be yourself,” or “backslides” from his religious promises or is criticized for exaggerated virtue, or “puts aside his party disguise” or is warned that “the party is over,” or “forgets his scientific problem for awhile” or is chided for his “absent mindedness” that in each case he returns to “life as usual” or is expected to give evidence of his grasp of the institutionalized common understandings of the organization and workings of the everyday society, i.e. his “practical circumstances.”

A third modification consists of the instrumental transformations of real environments of objects that occur in experimentally induced psychosis, extreme fatigue, acute sensory deprivation, the use of hallucinogenic drugs, brain injuries and the like. To each of these there corresponds the modification of the presuppositions on the one hand and the social structures that are produced by actions oriented to these modified environments on the other. For example, subjects who were given Lysegic Acid at the U.C.L.A. Alcoholism Clinic frequently met the experimenter’s inquiries about what they saw in the room with the rebuff that his questions were banal and indicated a stupid fellow who could never appreciate what they saw even if they were to trouble themselves to try to make it plain to him. An analysis of the interaction using Bales’ scoring procedures would have varied accordingly.

In his essay, “The Stranger” Schutz spoke of another modification which he described as their “ceasing to stand the test.” The stranger for Schutz was the person whose attempts to assign the attributes of the attitude of daily life to the intended sense of actual appearances produced situations of chronic “error.” He becomes, says Schutz, the person who has to place in question nearly everything that seems to be unquestionable to the members of the group in which he seeks membership.

His hitherto unquestioned schemes of interpretation become invalidated and cannot be used a scheme of orientation within the new social surroundings. He uses with difficulty the in-group culture as a scheme of orientation for he is unable to trust it. The apparent unity of the cultural pattern for the in-group members does not exist for him. He has continually to realize his interests while having to reckon with fundamental discrepancies between his own and other’s ways of seeing situations and handling them. Situations that in-group members see through in a glance and see too the appropriate recipe for its management, are specifically problematic and lacking in obviousness
of sense or consequences. From the in-group member’s view the stranger is a man without history. Most importantly, too, his crisis is a personal crisis.

In the language of this paper, the perceivedly normal appearances of the stranger scenes of interaction are for him specifically problematical. The stranger is the person whose competence i.e. whose rights to manage the decisions of sensibility, objectivity, and warrant neither he nor others are able to take for granted.

Since each of the presuppositions assigns a feature to the actor’s environment, the user may suffer a nasty surprise with respect to each of them. Thus there is another modification. It is possible to induce experimentally the breach of these suppositions by deliberately modifying scenic events so as to systematically disappoint these attributions. The attributer’s environment should thereby be made strange to him and accordingly he should act in the presence of others like a stranger.

It was decided in the author’s course to use a procedure that would breach the presupposed interchangeability of standpoints and the congruency of relevances. Accordingly, students were asked to enter a store, select a customer, and treat the customer as a clerk while giving no recognition that the subject was any other person than what the experimenter took him to be and without giving any indication that the experimenter’s treatment was anything other than perfectly reasonable and legitimate. The following protocol is the work of a 40 year old, female virtuoso.

“While visiting with a friend Pasadena I told him about this being-taken-for-the-clerk experiment. The friend is a Professor Emeritus of Mathematics at the California Institute of Technology and the successful author of many books, some technical, some fictional, and he is most satirical in his contemplations of his fellow man. He begged to be allowed to accompany me and to aid me in the selection of scenes….We went first to have luncheon at the Atheneum which caters to the students, faculty and guests of Cal Tech. While we were still in the lobby my host pointed out a gentleman who was standing in the large drawing room near the entrance to the dining room and said, “Go to it. There’s a good subject for you.” He stepped aside to watch. I walked toward the man very deliberately and proceeded as follows. (I will use E. to designate myself; S, the subject.)

E. “I should like a table on the West side, a quiet spot, if you please, and what is on the menu?”
S. (turned toward E. but looked past and in the direction of the foyer,) said, “Er, ah, madame, I’m sure.” (looked past E. again, looked at a pocket watch, replaced it, and looked toward the dining room.)
E. Surely luncheon hours are not over, what do you recommend I order today?”
S. “I don’t know, you see, I’m waiting - -“
E. (Interrupted with) “Please don’t keep me standing here while you wait, kindly show me to a table.”
S. “But Madame, - -“ (started to edge away from door, and back into the lounge in a slightly curving direction around E.)
E. “My good man, (at this S.’s face flushed, his eyes rounded and opened wide)
S. “But- -you- -I- -oh dear!” (he seemed to wilt)
E. (Took S.’s arm in hand and propelled him toward the dining room door, slightly ahead of herself.)

S. Walked slowly ahead but stopped just within the room, turned around and for the first time looked directly and very appraisingly at E. took out the watch, looked at it, held it to his ear, replaced it, and muttered “Oh dear.”

E. “It will take only a minute for you to show me to a table and take my order, then you can return to wait for your customers, after all, I am a guest and a customer too.”

S. (Stiffened slightly, walked jerkily toward the nearest empty table, held a chair for E. to be seated, bowed slightly,) muttered “My pleasure” hurried toward the door, stopped, turned, looked back at E. with a blank facial expression.

At this point E’s host walked up to S., greeted him, shook hands, and propelled him towards E.’s table. S. stopped a few steps from the table, looked directly at, then through, E. and started to walk back toward the door. Host told him E. was the young lady whom he had invited to join them at lunch, (then introduced me to one of the big names in world physics, a pillar of the institution!) E. seated himself reluctantly and perched rigidly on his chair, obviously uncomfortable. E. smiled, made light and polite inquiries about his work, mentioned various functions attended which had honored him, then, complacently remarked that it was a shame E. had not met him personally before now, so that she should not have mistaken him for the maitre-d. The host chattered about his long-time friendship with me, while S. fidgeted and looked again at his pocket watch, wiped his forehead with a table napkin, looked at E. but avoided meeting her eyes. When the Host mentioned that E. is studying sociology at UCLA. S. suddenly burst into loud laughter, realized that everyone in the room was looking in the direction of our table, abruptly became quiet, then said to E. “You mistook me for the maitre-d, didn’t you?”

E. “Deliberately, sir.”

S. “Why deliberately?”

E. “Diabolic. But clever, I must say.” To our host, “I haven’t been so shaken since--- denounced my theory of---- in 19--.” “And the wild thoughts that ran through my mind!—Call the receptionist from the lobby, go to the men’s room, turn this woman over to the first person that comes along. Damn these early diners, there’s nobody coming in at this time. Time is standing still, or my watch has stopped. I will talk to--about this, make sure it doesn’t happen to “somebody.” Damn a persistent woman. I’m not he “good man!” I’m Dr.----, and not to be pushed around. This can’t be happening. If I do take her to that damned table she wants I can get away from her, and I’ll just take it easy until I can- I remember---(hereditary psychopath, wife of one of the “family” of the institution) Maybe if I do what this one wants she will not make any more trouble than this. I wonder if she is “off.” She certainly looks normal. Wonder how you can really tell?”

The risks for persons whose appearances breach these attributions- whether they do accomplish it experimentally, or whether like the psychopath they manage it by their habitual conduct- are considerable. From the status of a perceivedly
competent person in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, i.e. from the status of bona-fide membership, he may move or be moved by persons for whom these attributions continue to operate to the alternative statuses of criminal, ill, or incompetent social objects. Such statuses are characteristically assigned to those who “lack common sense.” The mother tongue provides for a range of social types who do not appreciate these attributions or for whom the attributions are felt not to operate: children, adolescents, aged persons, outsiders, boors, fools, ignoramuses, and barbarians. Organizationally speaking, those who lack common sense not only are trusted, but themselves do not trust. Indeed, one might define the trustworthy and trusting person as someone who manages the discrepancies with respect to these attributions in such a fashion as to maintain a public show of respect for them.

A radical modification consists of rendering the presuppositions inoperative. Preliminary work is currently underway in order to develop the appropriate methods for the study of this condition. This modification consists of subjecting the person to the branch of any one of the attributions (a) while making it difficult for him to transform the situation into a game, an experiment, and the like from one that is known in the manner of daily life as a matter of enforceable morality, (in the language of social psychology, making it difficult for his to “leave the field”), (b) while making it necessary for him to manage the reorganization of the “natural facts” in sufficient time with respect to the mastery of the circumstances for which he calls upon his knowledge of the natural facts, and (c) while requiring him to manage the reorganization of the natural facts by himself and without consensual support. Having no alternative but to normalize incongruities within the normative order of events of daily life, subjects should become confused. We expect that under such conditions events will lose their perceivedly normal appearances. The person should be unable to assign an occurrence its status as an instance of a class of events; judgements of likelihood should fail him; he should be unable to compare present occurrences with orders of events that he has known in the past; he should be unable to assign let alone “see in a glance” the conditions under which an occurrence can be reproduced; he should be unable to order occurrences to means-ends relationships; and finally the sense that events are required in their occurrence in accordance with a moral principle perceivedly found in the environment should be lost.

One should encounter the behaviors of bewilderment, uncertainty, internal conflict, massive incongruity, psychological isolation, acute anxiety, loss of identity, and various symptoms of depersonalization. In short, one should encounter what Paul Schilder38 in a brilliant phrase referred to as “an amnesia for social structure.” The severity of these effects should vary directly with the enforceable commitment of the person to a grasp of the “natural facts of life” and independently of personality characteristics as determined by any of the standard assessment devices. A preliminary study with 28 pre-medical students gave encouraging results. Because of errors in design and procedure, however, findings must be held with strictest reservations.

The fact that its modification include such possibilities as its being learned, of its ceremonial and instrumental transformations, of its being breached, and of its being made inoperative gives the attitude of daily life a critical place in any attempt to account for stable, persistent, continuing, uniform social interactions. In accounting for the persistence and continuity
of the features of a social system, sociologists commonly select some set of stable characteristics of an organization of activities and then inquire into the variables that contribute to their stability. An alternative procedure would appear to be more economical: to start with a system that shows stable features and ask what can be done to make for trouble. The operations that one would have to perform in order to multiply and sustain the anomic features of the perceived environments and the disorganized character of the interaction would tell us how the structures are ordinarily and routinely being maintained.

In reviewing modifications of the attitude of daily life and its corpus one begins to sense why it is that the theme of common sense thinking has been a major one in all major philosophies. One may begin to sense too why the phenomenon of common sense thinking, activities, and knowledge is such an obstinate feature and is so strongly idealized and defended in all stable groups.

Concluding Remarks

1. Sociological inquiry is commonly thought of as a process that starts with known social structures, known in any way whatever, and transforms this description into an object of theoretical sociological interest. The processes of inquiry are thereupon conceived as procedures for clarifying this transformed object via the methods of sociological inquiry. Commonly these procedures are characterized as procedures of rational criticism of common sense knowledge of social structures. The model for such rational criticism and rationality in sociological procedures and its products is found in the published journal article.

In view of the previous arguments of this paper much of current sociological inquiry might with equal justification be conceived to consist in the use of the documentary method to steer the inquiry and to decide actual findings while the rational properties of calculable actions that are depicted in the journal article are used recommend what the inquiry was about, to describe its procedure, and to recommend its findings. The actual work of rationalizing common sense knowledge of social structures might better be described as the process of depicting actions of inquiry taken in common sense situations as actions taken in calculable ones.

Just as it occurs in the conduct of everyday affairs, and on many occasions of the psychiatrist’s work, so too does it occur in the conduct of sociological inquiry, that persons must choose among alternative courses of action even though the goal they are trying to achieve may not be clear to them, nor do they know or have any assurance of what the consequences of a choice may be, nor are there any clear rules that they can consult in order to decide the wisdom of the choice. Along with this it frequently happens that if, after the action is taken, its results turn out either poorly or well for him, the person may be required to justify his action, to explain himself, to give his “reasons” for having acted as he did. Frequently in such a case a person or others will give an explanation that makes him appear as a person who knew exactly what he was doing. That persons “rationalize” their own and each others past actions and situations as well as their prospective ones is well known. Much less is known as to why it is that persons require this of each other, and how “being able to give satisfactory reasons” is not only dependent upon but contributes to the maintenance of stable routines of everyday life.
In Kaufmann’s sense of “fact” the science of sociology is a fact. Discussions of methodology in sociological inquiry which purport to tell how the science of sociology is possible but which omit references to the nature and functions of “satisfactory reasons” make scientific sociology out to be possible as a miracle is possible: its own products generate the faith.

2. All scientific disciplines have their great prevailing problems to which the methods of the particular discipline represent solutions. In sociology and the social sciences generally, as well as in the inquiries of everyday life, a prominent problem is that of achieving a unified conceptions of events that have as their specific formal property that their present character will have been decided by a future possible outcome. Motivated actions, for example, have precisely this troublesome property. Because the documentary method consists essentially of the retrospective-prospective reading of a present occurrence so as to maintain the constancy of the object through temporal and circumstantial alterations in its actual appearance, it shows its particular usefulness as a method that is capable of handling events having this peculiar time structure. While its necessity in the sociological program has not been demonstrated, the documentary method is prominently encountered as a feature of situations in which the rules that govern communicative exchanges create situations of incomplete information in which actions nevertheless must be taken, matters of fact decided, and interpretations made. The method would seem to be an intimate part of a social process whereby a body of knowledge must be assembled and made available for legitimate use despite the fact that the situations it purports to describe (1) are in any calculable sense essentially unknown, and (2) are created by the fact and manner of being addressed.

FOOTNOTES

* This investigation was supported by a Senior Research Fellowship SF-81 from the Public Health Service. The materials for this paper are taken from a book in preparation by the author and Dr. Aaron V. Cicourel, Northwestern University. I wish to express particular gratitude to my colleagues, Dr. Eleanor B. Sheldon and Mr. Egon Bittner of the University of California, Los Angeles and Dr. Cicourel for their generosity in furnishing me with criticisms and ideas. Readers who are acquainted with the magnificent writings of the late Alfred Schutz will recognize the size of the debt that this paper owes to him. The paper is respectfully dedicated to him as an esteemed teacher and sociologist.

1 As they will be used in this paper, the concepts “collectivity” and “membership” are intended in strict accord with Talcott Parsons’ usage in The Social System, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1951, and in Part II, General Introduction, Reader in Sociological Theory, dittoed mss, by Talcott Parsons, 1959.

2 The theoretical problems the person must “solve” as well as his “solutions” are matters for the sociological theorist to decide. The person may or may not be aware that he is engaged in a methodological enterprise.
The term “anonymity of the observer” names the problem of furnishing a guarantee that the object’s features are invariant to personal perspectival appearances and personal historical relevances, i.e. that the object’s features are not matters of personal opinion.

The anonymity consist of the irrelevance to the sense of what is proposed to what is known about the person who proposes it. For the case of ideal scientific activity this irrelevance is entirely defined by consulting the correspondence between prescribed and actually employed rules of procedure. In the case of everyday life this irrelevance is decided by consulting “what any competent member knows.”

The term “communality” names the problem of furnishing the guarantee that observes will be agreed that the observable features of the object correspond to intended features.

The Anyman of ideal scientific procedures is a man without a community. He consists of a disembodied, socially disengaged, “mere” manual of proper ways of proceeding. he is without a history, prospects, purposes, private life, prior knowledge, unbound by past or promissory commitments to normative or actual social structures. Knowledge in common is a consequence of actions governed by these maxims. From the standpoint of ideal scientific procedure an actual person acting scientifically is at best a forgiveable instance of a person seeking to act in compliance with these rules as his sole maxims of investigative conduct.

The collectivity members’ Anyman stand in sharp contrast. He is anyone of us. That a finding holds for Anyman states that knowledge in common is guaranteed by agreement among persons who are technically and morally competent members of the collectivity, i.e. anyone of us.

For the case of ideal scientific activity agreement among “colleagues” is the consequence of adherence to the rules. In the case of everyday inquiry agreement among “colleagues” is presupposed as a condition of sensibility and realism.

By “define” is meant constitutive of the meaning of “correct decisions.”

“Solutions” is used in the sense akin to its use in functional analysis when actions are spoken of as “solutions” to “functional problems.” It is not a question therefore of whether the problem is being solved since the actions, whatever they consist of, are by conception, solutions. Therefore the question is always how the problem is being solved and with what consequences. The question is not whether or not they are being solved.


Kaufmann, Felix, Methodology of Social Sciences, Oxford University Press, New York, 1944.

Ibid. pp. 17-32; 48-66

Ibid. pp. 48-66

The concept of the set, “body of knowledge” is borrowed from Kaufmann’s concept of the corpus of a science. This concept is developed in Methodology of the Social Sciences, pp. 33-47
What holds for the set $K$ and its sub-sets when speaking of propositions, holds as well when the set $K$ and its sub-sets refer to the actor’s environment of objects.

The rule in the game of tic-tac-toe that players must move alternatively may be expressed as a set of possible events as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>He is followed by player</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A moves</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B moves</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of percentages in the calls may be taken to define the possible events in the player’s environment that player may use as a standard which he seeks through his actions to produce and/or respect as a governing condition of his actions. An alternative distribution, like

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

would be a different maxim.

To each normative description of possible events as maxims of conduct there correspond the actual events of conduct. For example, when adults play tic-tac-toe the two distributions are likely to look like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maxims of Conduct</th>
<th>Actual Conduct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When adults play with children differences between the two distributions occasionally occur. In non-game situations differences between normative and actual distributions are rarely as small as the differences found in games. This point is elaborated in the author’s monograph in preparation, Rules, Maxims, and Normative Orders of Action in Games and Daily Life.


16 This concept is discussed below in connection with the game of kriegsspiel. See pp. 65-68.

17 I wish to thank Drs. Robert Boguslaw and Myron A. Robinson of the System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California for the many hours of discussion that we had about “simple” and “complex” situations of choice when we were trying together to work through the problem of how consistently successful play in chess is possible.


20 I wish to thank Mr. Peter McHugh, graduate student in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles for his help as an experimenter and for many useful ideas contained in his report on this procedure.

21 This concept is detailed in the author’s unpublished paper, “Some conceptions and experiments with ‘trust’ as a condition of stable concerted action” a version of which was read at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Society, Detroit, 1957.


23 See footnote 22. The material in the following pages 36-42 is based almost entirely upon Schutz’ writings.


25 In various studies social scientists have documented this rule. Studies in the sociology of knowledge, as these studies were programmed by Karl Mannheim in his classic work, Ideology and Utopia, Harcourt Brace, and Company, New York, 1936, took this rule as a point of departure in defining one area of the empirical concerns of the sociology of knowledge.


28 Personal communication.

29 In his article, “On the interpretation of Weltanschauung,” Mannheim argued that the documentary method is peculiar to the social sciences. There exists in the social sciences many terminological ways of referring to it, viz “the method of understanding,” “sympathetic introspection,” “method of intuition,” “method of insight,” “method of understanding,” “interpretive method,” “clinical method,” “empathic understanding,” and so on. Attempts by sociologist to identify something called “interpretive sociology” involves the reference to the documentary method as the basis for encountering and warranting its findings. Whether its widespread use is necessary to sociological inquiry is the question that this section is concerned with.

30 For example, “Never open with a pair of deuces,” “Do not bluff early in the game,” “Never bet more than the present worth of the hand.”
With respect to the advice against talking, the kriegsspiel player is advising that there are various ways of getting information about the effect of a move, the location of pieces, contemplated strategies and so on. Some people, for example, blow or grunt when they lose an important piece. Some players become animated when they anticipate something good. In a word, they start communicating directly instead of through the referee. The good kriegsspiel player knows that where there are messages, there is the possibility of information. But he also knows that by their very nature there is no way of telling what information one is giving away by “inadvertent gestures.” Another piece of advice runs: “Keep an accurate piece count.” A failure to remember how many pieces the opponent has lost makes it impossible later in the game to maintain the continuity of a line of assessment so that the player is unable to evaluate possible moves or to realize much less correct for errors. The game becomes a literal jumble. The advice about suspending the game if one has to leave goes to the point that the information in the game is cumulative in such a way that two definitions of the state of the game can only be grossly matched.

I take the theoretical problem of social order to consist in this: How to reconcile the phenomena of stable, persistent, reproducible social structures with the fact that these structures are the products of auctions undertaken by persons oriented to the environments of the society “seen from within.” Any theory of social organization has the methodological status of a solution. The empirical problem of social order consists of the tasks that the investigator must solve in achieving credible, clear, reproducible descriptions of these two phenomena and their relationships.

These properties are: (1) The compatibility of ends-means relationships with the principles of formal logic; (2) Reserving the right to withhold credence from a mystery; (3) Making the task of clarification itself the project to be accomplished in the inquiry; (4) The compatibility of the definition of the situation of inquiry with scientific knowledge. Cf. Schutz “The problem of rationality in the social world,” Op. cit. pp.


