Wahrnehmung und Inferenz : über die Möglichkeit einer nicht-inferentiellen Basis unserer Überzeugungen über die Welt

This work is concerned with the question whether perception…

(A1) ...can be a non-inferential basis for our beliefs about the world.
(A2) …can stand in inferential relations with our beliefs about the world.

If we take modern scientific findings (especially in the field of neurosciences) and the actual debate in the philosophy of perception into account, it can seem obscure how perception should be able to meet these requirements.
Therefore this work is concerned with showing how perception still can meet (A1) and (A2). To argue for this view on perception, it is important to give a clear picture of what is meant by “inference” (or “inferential”) in epistemological contexts (chapter 2). Only then we can make sense of the idea of an unconscious inference that could harm the non-inferential-basis-requirement (A1) – and drop this idea at the end of chapter 3. In chapter 4 it will be shown that also non-conceptual perception/experience – other than lots of contemporary philosophers of perception claim – can stand in inferential relations to beliefs about the world (A2).