Leite Cabrera Pereira da Rosa, Daniel
Preferred name
Leite Cabrera Pereira da Rosa, Daniel
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Publication Access status: Open Access , Kants Philosophie der MaximenThe main purposes of this work are to examine (1) what Kant means by subjectivity when he defines maxims as subjective practical principles and (2) how maxims and practical laws relate to each other according to Kant. Taking into account the secondary literature, I distinguish four possible concepts of subjectivity and four possible concepts of objectivity. I then show that the concept of subjectivity ascribed to maxims and the concept of objectivity ascribed to practical laws are not mutually exclusive concepts. Maxims (in the strict Kantian sense) are subjective only in the sense that they express the element of individual self-determination in acting. I then test those conclusions by analysing Kant’s concrete use of the concept of maxim in his main moral writings. I also show that this interpretation leads to some important conclusions concerning Kant’s theory of action, namely: that every freely performed action presupposes a maxim, that the moral agent may never formulate in his mind some of his maxims and that maxims are not prescriptive principles. Finally, I explore Kant’s image of a practical syllogism formulated in a passage of the second Critique and give a reconstruction of its form. I then argue that this reconstruction can shed new light on the relation between maxims and practical laws.Source Type:Doctoral Thesis7 43